

U.S. SENATE RESOLUTIONS

(Senate Resolution 324) - Introduced by Senator Lodge, and passed by the Senate unanimously on May 17, 1920.

"Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corytza), the Twelve Island of the Aegean, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the Peace Conference to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece."

Congressional Record. Volume 59, Part VB, p. 7100.

(Senate Resolution 82) - Submitted by Senator Pepper; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. March 27 (Legislative day, March 5), 1946, Reported by Mr. Connally, without amendment. Considered and agreed to July 29, 1946.

"Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corytza), the Twelve Islands of the Aegean Sea, known as the Dodecanese Islands, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the Peace Conference to Greece and become incorporated in the territory of Greece."

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THE GREEK CLAIMS ON NORTHERN EPIRUS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The second World War and especially its Greek-Italian phase has brought to the forefront once more the question of the Albanian-Greek frontier. Greece is again claiming that portion of Albania along its northwestern border known sometimes as Northern Epirus and sometimes as Southern Albania which has been within its grasp on several occasions and which has been taken away on as many occasions. The question of Northern Epirus crystallized when during the first Balkan War, Greek expansion came into conflict with Italian-Austrian interests and Albanian nationalism. While the origin of the question dates specifically to 1912, there are evidences of a pending struggle between Albanian and Greek nationalisms in Epirus as far back as the time of the Congress of Berlin. Since 1912 the question has figured prominently in European politics from time to time and numerous writings have appeared on the subject. In the fall of 1940 it was opened again when the Greek army entered Albania in the attempt to drive out the Italians. As the Greeks advanced into the region they made no secret of their intention to retain the southern portions of Albania which they had been claiming since the Balkan Wars. Greek newspapers referred to Koritza after its fall to Greek forces late in November of 1940 as a "liberated Greek town." (1) Thus the war against Italy while aiming immediately to save Greece from the Fascists also had the secondary aim of fulfilling Greek ambitions in the direction of Albania.

This paper has been undertaken with the aim of examining the Greek claims to Northern Epirus in the past and of determining the extent to which these claims have been recognized. In this connection the attitude of the Powers in Europe is of the utmost importance and cannot be overestimated. It may even be argued that were it not for the insistence of Austria and Italy for the creation of an Albanian State, Albania today would be but a mere geographic expression forming parts of Greece and Yugoslavia. The Powers created Albania and the

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Powers decided where it should touch Montenegro, where it should touch Serbia and where it should touch Greece.

Even as this paper was being written, the question of Northern Epirus fast re-assumed international importance with the three current Great Powers playing what will undoubtedly be the major roles in whatever settlement will result. Diplomatic battle has been joined both at the Paris Peace Conference and in the United Nations Organization over the Greek-Albanian dispute. The discussion of the dispute in Paris was brief, having been ended by the unexplained Greek withdrawal of the question from the open Conference. This withdrawal will make the final decisions even more dependent on the Great Powers since the Greek delegation has reserved the right to bring up the dispute before the Council of Foreign Ministers. (2) This Council is, of course, made up of the Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. However, the brief history of the dispute in the open Conference is of interest because it affords us a study in trends.

It is already evident that the Soviet Union will oppose the Greek claims. While it is yet not clear what course the United States and Great Britain will take, there are evidences that they will be favorably disposed to consider the Greek claims. The Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov looked upon the Greek attempt to introduce the Northern Epirus question to the Peace Conference as "a very dangerous thing because it is calculated to create trouble in the Balkans." (3) The Foreign Commissar did not explain what kind of trouble it would cause but the statement makes it obvious that he is not favorably inclined to the loss of that territory by Albania which is in the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States seems to be favorably inclined to Greece, which is within the Anglo-American sphere, on this matter. American Secretary of State Byrnes was quick to defend the Greek position when Mr. Molotov tried to block the Greek proposal for the discussion of the Greek-Albanian dispute. It seemed

incredible to Mr. Byrnes "that we would deny one of the 21 governments that furnished troops to aid us in victory the opportunity to present its case." (4) Although Mr. Byrnes stated on the same occasion that the "United States has no conviction on the territorial dispute," (5) the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate earlier in the year unanimously approved a resolution for awarding Northern Epirus to Greece. (6) Great Britain had taken the same attitude at the Peace Conference as the United States on this matter. And since Britain and America have been working together on trying to limit Russian influence in the Balkans and Near East it is more than likely that they will stand together on the Greek-Albanian question. The British delegate supported Mr. Byrnes on hearing the Greek claims against Albania. (7) Although the available evidence seems to point to a split among the three Great Powers over the Greek-Albanian dispute, with the Soviet Union backing the latter and the United States and Britain backing the former, it will be hard to predict the exact course of the struggle because we do not know what turn the discussions will take.

The Albanian application for admission to the United Nations Organization has also occasioned delicate complications. It is obvious that membership in the United Nations enhances the prestige of a nation since the organization includes the Great Powers, the remaining victorious nations and most of the important states of the world. The Albanians undoubtedly remember that in a parallel situation after the first World War their admission into the League of Nations helped to create a favorable atmosphere for Albania which helped to thwart her neighbours' designs. Albania's status during the war is precarious. She is viewed by such states as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Ukraine on the one hand as "the first European victim of Italian fascism"; (8) and on the other hand by the Greeks as an axis satellite which fought with the axis. (9) Membership in the United Nations would thus undoubtedly put Albania in a favorable position with respect to the international scene. With a precarious war time record, and

outside of the United Nations, her bargaining position against the Greek claims would be weaker than it would be if she were opposing the claims of a fellow member of the United Nations. Greece has opposed the Albanian application and for the time her position has been sustained.

When the American compromise plan for approval of the entry into the United Nations of eight candidate states representing countries within both the Soviet and Anglo-American spheres failed approval, the United States took a definite stand against Albania. Great Britain was already opposed to Albania while the Soviet Union sponsored the Albanian application for admission. Mr. Herschel Johnson, the American delegate, was ready to use the veto power of the United States, if necessary, to block Albanian admission. The use of the veto by the American delegate was made unnecessary when the Albanian application failed to get the necessary seven votes from the eleven countries represented on the Security Council. (10) The votes of the United States and Great Britain of course were 2 of the 3 negative ones cast; the Soviet Union and France were 2 of the 5 cast in the affirmative.

That the Albanians hope to open the question of the Greek-Albanian dispute in the United Nations is evident from the various appeals made to that body. The note addressed to the international organization by Dr. Ali Kuci, the Albanian war time resistance leader, sums up the Albanian viewpoint:

Greek claims on South Albania (Northern Epirus) are unjust and false and the Greeks are waging actually a war of nerves only to mislead world opinion and satisfy their imperialistic designs. (11)

The pains to which the Greeks have gone to bar Albania from the United Nations attests to the importance which they attach in keeping that state out of the organization and thus providing a more favorable atmosphere for their claims. It is interesting to note some of these developments because they will influence the final decisions. However, when it comes down to the actual discussion of the Greek-Albanian dispute reference will have to be made

to the history of the problem and both sides will look for arguments in that history.

Albania is located opposite the Italian "heel" along the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea bounded on the north and east by Yugoslavia and on the south by Greece. The Albanian-Greek frontier as drawn in 1913 by the Protocol of Florence has been satisfactory neither to Greece nor to Albania. According to this Protocol and the decisions reached at the London Conference, the former Turkish Province of Epirus, situated opposite the Island of Corfu along the Ionian-Adriatic coastline, was divided between Greece and Albania. The Greeks were confirmed in their possession of Southern Epirus while they were forced to give the northern section which they were also occupying to the newly constituted State of Albania. Ever since its assignment to Albania, Northern Epirus has loomed large in Greek aspirations and claims have been advanced on numerous occasions. The Albanians on the other hand contend that Northern Epirus is an integral part of Albania. They also contend that by the inclusion of Southern Epirus in Greece, Albania has been deprived of territory which is mostly Albanian. (12) With the exception of the Italians who annexed Southern Epirus to Albania during the recent occupation by the Axis Powers, no one has taken this contention seriously. And since this paper is concerned with the northern section of Epirus or Southern Albania, Southern Epirus will not be discussed except insofar as it helps to explain the main problem of Northern Epirus. While the Albanians prefer not to use the term "Northern Epirus" for Southern Albania, (13) the Greeks have refused to call it anything else:

The area known as Northern Epirus extends from the northern boundary of Greece as established in 1913 to a line drawn from the Valley of Moukazia, north of Valona on the Adriatic to Pogradets, on Lake Ochrida. It comprises unproductive mountainous territory comparable in geographic contour to the Greek peninsula consisting of the Kazas (counties) of Koritza, Argyrocastro, Starovo, Kolonia, Khimara, Delvino, Liaskoviki, Tepeleni, Premeti, Pogonion, with a total population of 228,000. Koritza and Argyrocastro are its main cities,

and Valona and Aghioi Saranda (Santi-Quaranta) its principal harbors. (14)

Originally the term Epirus was applied by the ancient Greeks loosely to the western portion of the Greek peninsula including sometimes the province of Akarnania to the south and going as far as the Skumbi River to the north (the ancient Genousos). (15) This is due to the fact that EPIRUS (=Epeiros) means "continent" or mainland in Greek, the appellation thus being used to differentiate between the whole of the west coast of the Greek mainland north of the Gulf of Corinth and the Ionian Islands. (16) In its more specific sense, according to ancient writers, Epirus extended on the north from the Glossa Promontory (near Valona) and on the south to the Gulf of Arta; and while Pindus formed the boundary between Thessaly and Epirus, the northeastern and eastern boundaries were uncertain. (17) It would seem the northern geographic limits of Northern Epirus as expounded by the Modern Greeks are supported by the ancient authorities. If we are to use the ancient geographical limits in defining the area of Epirus it is not unnatural to refer to the southern section of Albania as Northern Epirus. We notice in the official Greek definition of the boundaries and extent of Northern Epirus the inclusion of the city of Koritza and its area as forming the northeast extension of Northern Epirus. It is in this northeastern section, however, that the Greek limits seem to exceed the historical Epirus. "At no time during the ancient period does it (Northern Epirus) seem to have included Koritza and the district around Moskopolis." (18)

The early history of Epirus shows it to have had a Pelasgic culture and people. Later with the coming of the Greeks into the Greek peninsula it assumes a Hellenic culture and character. (19) With the fall of the Greeks, Epirus with the surrounding provinces of Illyria, Macedonia and Thessaly passed successively into the hands of the Romans, Byzantines, Slavs and Turks.

These penetrations have left the people of Northern Epirus as well as the rest of Albania with

a varied ethnic character. However, two main groups stand out: the Ghegs (north of the Semeni River) who are well formed and of an independent nature; and the Tosks (south of the Semeni River) who are shorter in stature and exhibit Greek physical characteristics and temperament. (20) The Ghegs who are tall are thought to be the descendants of Illyrians, while the Tosks are thought to be descendants of the Epirots or Pelasgians. (21) The more civilized portion of the country is the southern. In the north where the tribes are very unruly, conditions are unsettled.

In Albania the people are distributed into three main religious groups—into Mohammedans, Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox. When we look at the geographic concentration of the three chief religious groups, we see that the Catholics are concentrated in the extreme northern portions, the Greek Orthodox in the southern portions (Northern Epirus), and although the Mohammedans are to be found in all sections, they form a particularly solid core in the center. The distribution according to percentages is as follows: (22)

Mohammedans 66%
Roman Catholics 12%
Greek Orthodox 21%

While the religious cleavages would appear to be a handicap for a primitive country like Albania, the religious lines are in reality not drawn as strictly as in other parts of the Balkans. (23)

The Albanian language of today shows slightly less than 10% of the language to be of Illyrian roots. (24) the rest being made of words contributed by the various people that have had an influence on Albania. The dialects of the north and south are different enough to make free intercourse in language quite difficult. (25) In the south the people are bilingual to a great extent, speaking both Albanian and Greek.

When we examine the Greek and Albanian claims and counter-claims to the people of Northern Epirus, the complicated nature of the problem be-

comes evident. The Greeks hold that the culture and religion of the majority of the people are Greek and that the national and political consciousness of the people is Greek. (26) The Albanians contend that in Southern Albania (North Epirus) the people are Albanian "by blood, language, customs and feeling." (27) Thus both differ as to the criteria to be used in determining the nationality of the Epirots. This difference of criteria becomes understandable when we see that both the Greeks and Albanians use as arguments for the nationality of the Epirots the points which are advantageous to them. It is known that a majority of the Northern Epirots are Albanian in language. Often the women and the children do not know any other language than Albanian. (28) When the Greek statesman, Venizelos, presented the Greek claims to Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 he recognized "that a substantial portion of this Greek population has Albanian as its mother tongue, and is consequently, in all probability, of Albanian origin." (29) It is also known that the culture of Northern Epirus has been Greek. Greek has been the language of literature, education, and commerce as well as religion for the Orthodox Albanians. Greek culture was symbolized by the Greek school and church. The absence of a common historical tradition for the Albanian people and the lack of a literature made the Albanians turn to their co-religionist Greeks of the Orthodox Church for culture. (30) The Albanian Government has attempted to change this situation since the Greeks have used the cultural argument in their desires to annex the area. After the first World War the Government of Tirana closed the Greek schools in such areas as Koritza where the population was Albanian-speaking at home. (31) At the same time successful attempts were made to establish an autonomous Albanian Orthodox Church. (32) I have not been able to determine the amount of success the Albanian Government has had in minimizing Greek culture. However, I feel that it will be safe to say that Greek culture probably does not have the exclusive sway it had three decades ago.

There are no statistics on the basis of what the Northern Epirots desire to be called—Greeks or Albanians. Greek statistics show Greek majorities and Albanian statistics throw the majorities in the Albanian columns. The only available statistics that might be of some value are the Turkish statistics of 1908 for the whole province of Epirus. In considering Turkish statistics it is well to keep in mind the notorious inefficiency of the Turks. And while they probably do not present the picture they did at the time they were tabulated, since the region has undergone three major wars and population changes, in the absence of more reliable statistics they will afford us some basis for discussion. A hazy picture is better than no picture at all. These statistics classify the people of Epirus into Greeks and Moslems. The Turks, it will be remembered, classified all the Christian population as Greek whether they spoke Greek, Albanian or Vlach. (33) That is, the Greek Orthodox were all included in the Greek category whether they were Grecophone (Greek-speaking), Albanophone (Albanian-speaking) or Vlachophone (Vlach-speaking): (34)

DISTRICTS	GREEKS			Total Greeks	Musul- mans	Total Popula- tion
	Grecophones	Albanophones	Vlachophones			
Jannina	72,674	1,400	10,800	84,874	5,032	89,906
Ketsovo	5,862	5,862	5,862
Liescovikion	6,100	2,624	8,724	4,584	13,308
Preveza	12,542	12,542	1,854	14,396
Louros	20,162	1,100	21,262	882	22,144
Margariti	1,400	8,812	10,212	18,426	28,638
Philippas	17,340	250	100	17,690	11,276	28,966
Paranythia	9,936	2,600	12,536	4,704	17,240
Argyrocastro	13,178	7,916	21,094	21,032	42,126
Delvinon	12,231	4,155	16,386	5,450	21,836
Obelmarra	3,865	3,383	7,248	4,750	11,998
Tapelen	5,846	5,846	15,866	21,712
Prevezi	9,500	2,128	11,628	18,630	30,258
Pogonion	18,615	2,361	20,976	810	21,786
Total	193,905	47,586	15,409	256,900	113,296	370,196
Coryssa	43,800	1,214	45,014	53,919	98,933
Total	193,905	91,386	16,623	301,914	167,215	469,129

* Districts in Northern Epirus

This classification gave the Greeks an undisputed and overwhelming majority in the whole of Epirus. In this way the Turkish statistics may be said to be unfair to the Albanians. The Albanophone population may or may not prefer Greece, and they may not be classified as Greeks till they have definitely decided that it should be so. According to these statistics the Grecophone element was the largest of any other element (Albanophone, Vlachophone or Moslem) in the whole of Epirus. But if we detach Southern Epirus with its strong Grecophone majorities and reshuffle the figures in the statistics a bit, we see a different picture: We see that it takes the addition of the Albanophone Orthodox (and the Vlachophones) to give the Greeks a majority over the Moslems in Northern Epirus. If on the other hand the Albanophone element is taken as Albanian and is added to the Moslem Albanians, then the Grecophone element only appears to be a strong minority. It is clear that the Albanophone Orthodox are the determining factor in throwing the advantage either on the Greek or Albanian side.



II. EPIRUS AND GREECE - A SURVEY

Before we may understand the question of Northern Epirus which was produced in the twentieth century, we must first survey the success with which Greek aspirations to Epirus met in the nineteenth century. As in the twentieth, the attitude of the interested Powers was of the utmost importance. When the Greek Revolution broke out in 1821, England, France and Russia were the three Powers immediately interested. Austria, under the leadership of Metternich, who regarded the Greeks as rebels against legitimate authority, held aloof from the Greek struggle. In this she was followed by Prussia.

When repeated attempts by the Powers to get the sultan to submit to mediation in the Greek question failed, the Powers decided to force mediation which resulted in the destruction of the Turco-Egyptian fleet in October, 1827. After this feat of cooperation and with the death of Canning, who passed away two months before the allied victory at Navarino, the apparent cooperation of the three Powers gave way to diplomatic duelling, especially between Russia and England. When Wellington became Prime Minister in 1828 the sole objective of his government became the preservation of the Turkish Empire at any price. (35) The Russian Czar Nicholas decided to settle his outstanding differences with Turkey by a war commenced in May 1828. The pressing question for England then, was how to prevent the complete collapse of the Turkish Empire. Wellington had steadfastly refused to intervene in the Greek struggle. Only when the Russians were at the gates of Adrianople did he decide to intervene in common action with France in Greece to prevent the Czar from settling the Eastern question alone. (36) Even though the Duke was forced to accept the idea of a liberated Greece, he still persisted in the belief that a strong Turkey was of the utmost importance and therefore the Greece that had to be detached from the Turkish Empire had to be as small as possible. (37)

Once the decision had been made to create an independent Greece, the boundary settlement involved a bitter controversy, and the matter was brought under discussion in the Parliament as well as among the Ambassadors in London. During the revolution and in the proposals to Turkey by the Powers references were made to a "liberated" or "free" Greece but without any indication as to what this Greece was to include. On one occasion, when Russia and England in 1826 decided to act in common to get the Sultan to accept mediation we get a hint as to their viewpoint at the time, of how Greece was to be constituted. They intimated that if the Sultan persisted in his attitude of refusing mediation, "they would look to Greece with an eye of favour, and with a disposition to seize the first occasion of recognizing as an independent State such portion of her territory as would have freed itself from Turkish dominion." (38) Before this, and before the active participation of the Powers, Russia in 1824, in the discussions that were taking place relative to the Greek question, while not proposing Greek independence or an individual Greek State, proposed the creation of three Greek principalities vassal to the Sultan: Eastern Greece, consisting of Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; Western Greece, consisting of Epirus and Akarnania; and a third principality, consisting of the Morea with possibly Crete. (39) Although this solution would have left Greece divided and weak, it may be taken, because of its inclusion of Epirus in a Western Greek principality as the recognition by Russia that Epirus was part of the Greek world. The significant discussions as to what Greece should include, however, came towards the end of the revolution. In England we had two opposite views as to what the Greek State should include. Wellington, who led the government, favored as small a Greece as possible and this view ultimately prevailed. The liberal leaders in the Parliament favored a substantial Greece. In the House of Lords, the Lords Lansdowne, Holland and Melbourne and in the Commons, Lords Russell and Palmerston argued that the Greek settlement

could neither be advantageous or satisfactory to Europe or England if it did not make the new State of an adequate extent for defense and development. These liberals wanted Epirus and Thessaly and all the islands included in the Greek State. The arguments they advanced for the inclusion of these provinces in Greece, other than justice and humanity, proved prophetic: the Ottoman Empire would be in perpetual unrest and the peace of Europe would be endangered by the constant agitation in these provinces for emancipation. (40) The Tories brushed aside all these considerations coming from the liberals. When it appeared that the French and Russian proposals as to what the Greek State should be like were very similar to those expounded by the British Liberals, Tory opposition to a large Greece was re-enforced. (41) Thus "the young State, as finally delimited by the Protocol of February, 1830, was a State born mutilated." (42)

The resultant Greek frontier as definitely established by the Treaty of London, 1832 ran roughly from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Lamia. "Beyond that line, in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, were a large number of Greeks, who ardently desiring reunion with their brethren in the kingdom, still remained subject to the rule of the Sultan." (43) This meant that the main aim of the foreign policy of the new State would be expansion to include within the Greek borders all the lands still in Turkish hands inhabited mostly or to a great extent by Greeks.

In the nineteenth century the attention of this foreign policy was focused on the provinces immediately across the frontier—Epirus and Thessaly and, of course, Crete. This foreign policy of Greece caused it on three occasions—in 1854, 1878 and 1897—to resort to aggression or near aggression.

The first apparent opportunity to acquire Epirus and Thessaly came when the Turks were engrossed with Russia in 1853 in the conflict which upon the entry of England and France as Turkish allies came to be called the Crimean War. Since the interests

of England and France were with the Turks, it was natural that they should look upon any diversion for the Turkish forces, which were needed for the Russians, with disfavor. As soon as the available Turkish forces were sent north to oppose the Russians, the Greeks invaded the Sultan's holdings across the border. It was believed in Greece that the European provinces of the Sultan would fall easily before the allies of Turkey could step in and save her. The Greek invasion of Thessaly and Epirus was mostly in the form of armed bands including volunteers and undesirable elements. (44) Although the conduct of these bands were disgraceful, they did provide some diversion for the Turkish war effort because the Sultan had to send forces to fight the invaders, while the devastation caused by the invading bands lowered his resources. The Allies decided to intervene and stop the Greek annoyances. Before the allied interference could be felt, however, the Turks defeated the invaders in two engagements and drove them back over the border. In May 1854 French and British troops occupied the Pireaus and forced King Otto to abandon his Russian alliance and to observe strict neutrality. The first attempt by Greece to get Epirus ended in a fiasco. "At the Peace of Paris, Greece got nothing." (45)

This set-back was soon forgotten. In 1860 when Italian unification was being consummated, there was agitation in Greece which looked to Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace and Crete coming into Greece on the pattern of Italian unification. (46) In 1866 the Greeks again manifested their interest in the provinces to the north. In that year an insurrection had broken out in Crete and the Greeks toyed with the idea of encouraging an insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly.

The Greek claims to Epirus along with Thessaly and Crete came under serious discussion at the Congress of Berlin. It is at this time that we get an idea of what the Greeks expected when they asked for Epirus at the time. The period of the Congress foreshadows the eventual struggle in Epirus while it also marks the beginning of Greek ex-

pansion in that province and in Thessaly. Since the independence of Greece the struggle for Epirus had been between Greece and Turkey. The period of the Congress saw the beginning of Albanian nationalism and its entry into the Epirus question. The Albanian contender entered alongside the Turk in 1878. In 1913 he completely replaced the Turk.

When the war broke out in 1877 between Russia and Turkey the Greeks were not particularly enthusiastic because they looked upon it as a Slavic affair against the Turks since it involved Balkan Slavs as well as the Russians. When the Russians invited the Greeks to join, they accordingly refused. (47) However, when the Russians advanced to Adrianople, the Greeks became very interested. The people demanded war and the new Premier, Koumoundouros, supported the insurrection in Epirus, Thessaly and Crete in order to satisfy public opinion. The Government then made preparations to enter Turkish territory and provisionally occupy the coveted provinces. (48) But before they could begin, the Russian-Turkish armistice was signed and the invasion had to be put off.

The Russian victory over the Turks was ended by the Treaty of San Stefano signed March 3, 1878. The terms included the aggrandizement and independence of Montenegro and Serbia and the acquisition by Russia of territories and privileges from Turkey. The great feature of the treaty was the creation of a greater Bulgaria to extend from the Aegean to the Danube and from the Black Sea to the eastern limits of present day Albania. Since the Greeks had not participated in the war, they were completely ignored. Only in Article 15 do we see mention of the provinces claimed by the Greeks. In this article, provision was made by the Russians that the provinces of Epirus and Thessaly and other parts of European Turkey should have the same privileges of local government accorded by the *règlement organique* of 1868 to Crete. (49)

This treaty was not accepted by the Powers of Europe. The Russian domination of the Balkan

peninsula which the treaty established was distasteful to all the major Powers and especially to England and Austria. They both asked for a general European Congress which would bring the whole of the Treaty of San Stefano under review. When it appeared to Russia that a war with Austria and England was the only alternative she decided to accept.

The Congress was held at Berlin. There the Greek claims were taken up and Greek representatives were allowed to come and present their country's case. At the ninth session on June 29, 1878, Delyannis, the chief Greek delegate, read his statement to the great Powers. He asked for Crete and the limitrophe provinces (Epirus and Thessaly). (50) In this statement we have a generalized claim to the province of Epirus and the other territories. However, the instructions of the Greek Government to Delyannis gives us an indication as to what the Greeks were hoping for in the way of a northern border in Epirus at the time. Delyannis was to propose first as a northern boundary, which would include Thessaly and Epirus, the Rivers Peneus and Calamas and between them a boundary running from Zygo and Metzovo near the source of the Peneus which would follow the course of the Voioussa River (Ancient Aous) up to the source of the Calamas. (51) In Epirus the boundary proposed was a slight bit to the south of that given to the Greeks in 1913 which is the present boundary. In the same communication Delyannis was then instructed that if this boundary became impossible to obtain, to accept an alternative line which while keeping Peneus and the Calamas would have brought the boundary in the center considerably farther south and while leaving Jannina to the Greeks would have left the lands to the immediate northeast of that city in Turkey. (52)

All the Powers "were willing, and even anxious, for an extension of the Greek frontier, but no one was sufficiently interested to be prepared to force the Porte to make the necessary cession of territory." (53) The Greek question was an element in the larger Eastern question. The Congress had been call-

ed to undo the work of San Stefano and to minimize the Russian influence and gains. Obviously Turkey would have to be kept on its feet and could not be weakened by excessive territorial demands. At the thirteenth session, on July 5, 1878, Waddington, the French delegate at the Congress, supported by the Italian delegate, Corti, put forth the proposal that the Porte should be invited by the Congress to work out with Greece a rectification of boundaries in Epirus and Thessaly. The proposal was meant to be such that it did not entail difficult sacrifices for the Porte nor excessive claims on the part of Greece. (54) As a basis for the negotiations Waddington thought it appropriate to trace out a general boundary line which would indicate to Turkey what Europe expected in the way of concessions to the Greeks and at the same time to show to the Greeks the limits beyond which they could not go. The boundaries thus proposed by Waddington were to follow the valley of the River Peneus on the Aegean side and run to the valley of the Calamas River on the Ionian side. (55) This suggested boundary was roughly close to the alternative boundary Delyannis had been instructed to accept by the Greek Government. The settlement of the Greek-Turkish boundary was thus left to the Turks and Greeks. The Treaty of Berlin therefore left the Greek-Turkish frontier an open question. Article 24 of the treaty made provision for the mediation of the Powers in the event that Greece and Turkey could not reach an agreement along the lines indicated at the thirteenth session of the Congress.

Early in 1879 Greek and Turkish Commissioners met at Preveza in accordance with the Congress recommendations to see if they could work out an agreement for a new boundary. A series of meetings failed completely. The Turks held that the Congress recommendations as to the actual boundary were not obligatory and offered to Greece instead a narrow strip of territory parallel to the existing frontier. (56)

During the period of the Congress of Berlin there was noticeable excitement in various Albanian

districts both in the North and in Epirus. The proposed enlargement of Montenegro and the discussions relative to Greek claims appear to have aroused the interests of Albanians. The first signs of some sort of national feeling is thus evident at this time. Up till this point the Albanians had exhibited no significant tendencies toward nationalism. The slow growth of nationalistic feeling is due to various important reasons. The position of the Albanians in Turkey was exceptional with the consequence that the impelling force which caused the growth of Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nationalisms, the desire for independence, was lacking. The greater portion of the Albanians had been converted to Islam and were thus able to retain their lands and positions. Not being connected politically or racially with enemies of the Turkish Empire it was not dangerous for the Turks to allow them a large amount of autonomy in their mountain valleys. (57) Albanians were also given positions at Constantinople not open to Christians. Thus Albania was in a position to participate in the imperial authority while at the same time it exercised considerable local autonomy. Thus while Albania was in theory an integral part of the Empire, one third of the country was for all practical purposes as independent as Montenegro to the north. In one third of the kazas of Albania there was no taxation by the Turks and Turkish officials did not dare to enter without an invitation. (58)

Specifically Albanian nationalism dates from early in 1878. In that year the "League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation" was formed at Prizren in the north. The immediate cause that brought about the League was the Treaty of San Stefano which assigned territories inhabited by Albanians to the Slavic neighbors of Albania. (59) The aim of the League, however, was not independence; it sought the union of all territories inhabited by Albanians and the use of the Albanian language in this proposed united province but called for the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty; it also pledged resistance to any annexations of Albanian territory. (60) The Turks were quick to take ad-

vantage of these mild nationalistic manifestations. They encouraged the Albanians to resist the Berlin decisions and "even instigated the Albanians to substantiate their protest." (61) The Albanians outdid the Greeks in sending petitions to the Berlin Conference in 1880. The former demanded that Epirus remain in Turkey while the latter asked for its annexation.

After the failure of the Preveza conferences Waddington proposed that the negotiations should be renewed at Constantinople under the supervision of the Ambassadors of the Powers. This commission also broke down. The Greeks went north of the Berlin line and asked for Jannina and Metzovo to be included and the Turks offered a line running far to the south of these towns. The Greeks then proposed that the Powers arbitrate the frontier; Britain and France accordingly convened a Conference at Berlin in order to settle not only the Greek, but the Montenegrin question which also involved Albania.

Shortly after the breakdown of the Constantinople Commission, Waddington in a proposal to Salisbury suggested a line which would leave Jannina to Turkey. But Salisbury in a reply to Waddington's successor in the French Foreign Ministry believed that even this proposal was more favorable to Greece than the Berlin line, that the impression of the British Government was adverse and that it "did not entirely escape from the Albanian difficulty, which had been the chief impediment to the adoption of the solutions hitherto proposed." (62) Salisbury then suggested an investigation by an international commission composed of the representatives of the Powers to determine the frontier on the spot. The Powers accepted but the Turks were reluctant to do so because of the unsettled conditions of the area and because of the danger that the local populace might stage demonstrations for or against Greece. (53)

Provision had been made in the Berlin treaty for such a breakdown as had taken place in the Greek-Turkish negotiations. The Ambassadors of the Powers in Berlin met and again an attempt was made to find a new settlement for the thorny

problem. After detailed discussions, the frontier proposed and outlined by the French Ambassador, with the support of the British and Italian Ambassadors, was adopted by the Conference. This frontier was even more favorable to Greece than that suggested in the Treaty of Berlin. It was to run from the mouth of the Calamas River on the west to the crest of Olympus and the Aegean on the east. (64) This boundary would have included Jannina and Metzovo in Greece. The Porte refused to accept this decision which would have deprived the Empire of two important provinces.

In a note rejecting the proposition of the Powers, the Sublime Porte did not agree with the Powers that the proposed frontier was desirable. (65) The note pointed out that the loss of such strategic positions as Metzovo would have exposed the Turkish territory to attack; it asked how it would be possible to consent to the loss of territory inhabited by Albanians. It also pointed out that the Conference exceeded the original proposal of Waddington at the Congress. The note ended by inviting the Powers to authorize their representatives in Constantinople to undertake negotiations with the Porte which would aim to solve the frontier question and dependent secondary questions.

When it became evident that the Turks would not consent to the loss of the territories in question, Greece prepared for war and was ready to resort to arms without awaiting the Turkish consent which was necessary for any territorial cession. The situation was becoming truly delicate and the efforts of both France and England were directed at preventing the Greeks from doing anything rash which would lead to greater complications. In the meantime the Ministry changed in France and Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, who succeeded de Freycinet, was much cooler towards satisfying Greece to the extent outlined at the Berlin Conference. With the Greeks preparing for war and the Turks ready to resist, he was afraid that the Eastern question would be reopened with a repetition of the events of 1877. He pointed out that the Conference decision could only

peacefully be put into effect with the consent of Turkey. (66) The British Foreign Minister, Granville, was getting impatient with this French attitude and while not insisting on the Conference suggestions, felt that steps should be taken to satisfy the legitimate claims of Greece. (67) This dilatory and infirm attitude of the Powers encouraged the Porte to resist the cession of what was considerable territory. In the end the Turkish suggestion for a conference at Constantinople was adopted. There the Turks met the representatives of the Powers. Greece was excluded from participation in this conference. The Turks again insisted upon the impossibility of ceding most of Epirus upon military grounds and because of the Albanian-Moslem population. The importance which the Turks attached to keeping Epirus is demonstrated by their offer a short time before this latest Constantinople Conference of Crete instead of Epirus. On May 24, 1881, the Convention of Constantinople was signed. Through this Convention, Greece received most of Thessaly and that part of Epirus forming the district of Arta next to the frontier of 1832. The new frontier ran from the defile of Karalik-Dervend, three miles south of Platamona and a bit north of the vale of Tempe to the River where Arta is situated, then south along that River to the Ambrakian Gulf. (68) This marks the first step in the Greek northward advance in Epirus. A greater stride was made in the first Balkan War which saw the Greeks occupy the whole province.

The Greco-Turkish War of 1897 provided the last occasion in the nineteenth century on which the Greeks attempted to detach Epirus from Turkey. This war did not come as a result of the desire to take Epirus. It started with the decision to help the revolted Cretans. The quick defeat of the Greek army in Epirus and Thessaly necessitated the intervention of the Powers not only to stop the war, but to keep the gains of 1881 from reverting to the victorious Turks. The question resulting from this war was then not whether Greece was to get more territory but rather to keep what she already had.

III. THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN EPIRUS

The twentieth century was to see the termination of Turkish power in the whole of the Balkan peninsula. The all but complete ejection of the Turks from Europe was the culmination of a process which began a century earlier with the growth of the various Balkan nationalisms. As hostile as these nationalisms were to each other they were able to combine forces in 1912 to drive out their common enemy from Macedonia, Old Serbia, Albania, Epirus and most of Thrace. Towards the end of 1912 the Bulgarians, Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek armies pounced upon the remnants of the Turkish dominions in Europe. The Young Turks who were then guiding the destinies of the Ottoman Empire helped to precipitate the war by their policies of unification and Turkification. In a few months Turkey in Europe was reduced to an insignificant Thracian hinterland around Constantinople.

The Balkan problem, however, was not one that could be left simply to the Balkan States and Turkey. The interests of the Powers were interwoven with those of each Balkan State and with Turkey, and the Balkan problem presented one aspect of the Eastern question which was really a European question. Of especial interest to all the Great Powers and particularly to Austria and Italy and to the Balkan countries of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece was that section of the Balkan peninsula which today is known as the State of Albania and which at that time was not very well defined. Indeed no question raised by the Balkan War was so fraught with dangers. Even the disposal of Macedonia presented fewer difficulties for European peace. Russia and Austria, the two countries most directly concerned, allowed the Balkan allies to impose whatever terms they pleased on the Turks in Macedonia; (69) later the second Balkan War between the Allies finally settled the partition of Macedonia. "The salient point was the Albanian question." (70)

The advance of the Serbians to the Adriatic and the progress of the Greeks northward along their

western shore into Epirus alarmed the Austrians and Italians respectively. In both Italy and Austria the naval and military authorities would not hear of the Serbians gaining access to the Adriatic or of the Greeks pushing their boundary to Valona or even north of Corfu. (71) Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, and one of the principal participants in the affairs relating to Albania, said of the Austrian-Serbian situation:

Austria was determined that if Albania ceased to be Turkish territory it should not pass into the hands and form part of the aggrandizement of Serbia. Serbia, borne on the tide of her own victories, might easily reach the point of inevitable conflict with Austria. If this happened, and if Russia felt that she was required to support Serbia, European war was inevitable. (72)

The Italians on the other hand warned the Greeks that they could not tolerate the occupation of the Bay of Valona. (73) If these countries were to come to grips there was no telling where it would stop. When Sir Edward Grey saw these dangers arising from the Albanian question, he proposed that the Powers come together and confer with the aim of solving the problem. After some negotiation London was picked for the Conference. Sir Edward Grey represented Britain while the Ambassadors of France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, represented those countries.

Although the Balkan situation in general was the subject of discussion at the Conference, "the main work was to secure agreement between the Great Powers by dealing with the question of Albania." (70) The Balkan allies recognized with a minimum amount of opposition the right of the Powers to assume the responsibility of settling the question of Albania. Article 2 of the unratified treaty of London which ended the war between Turkey and the Balkan States expressly turned over the solution of the Albanian problem to the six Powers. (75) The main question at the Conference relative to Albania was not whether there should be an Albania, but rather what it should include. Albanian independence was unanimously agreed upon

at the first sitting of the Ambassadors. It is well to point out here that the recognition of Albanian independence by the London Conference was not strictly diplomatic expediency. That is, the Conference was not bowing to Austro-Hungarian and Italian demands by agreeing to the establishment of Albania. We know that there is an Albanian people, we have seen the mild beginning of its nationalism; we have also seen that actually certain Albanian districts were for most purposes independent under the Turks. The Conference was thus recognizing a fact by creating an Albanian State. (76)

The great difficulties in the Albanian question were the boundaries. What were the boundaries of the new State to be like? The Powers agreed that in the north they were to touch Montenegro, in the northeast Serbia and in the south Greece. They disagreed, however, as to the points of contact.

In the ensuing discussions the powers did not lose track of their own interests and inclinations in supporting the various proposals. The alignment of the Powers on the various issues falls remarkably well along the alliance pattern of the day. The Albanian issues were also alliance issues—the Triple Alliance versus the Triple Entente. Italy and Austria-Hungary "pleased with the idea of inserting between Greece and Serbia a State hostile to both and friendly to Bulgaria and Turkey," (77) pressed for a large Albania. Germany as the third member of the Alliance went along with its allies. (78) Russia and France as members of the Triple Entente pressed for a small Albania. Russia, as the Great Slav Power, backed the Serbian claims, while France, which was experiencing a renewed interest in Greece, backed the Greek claims. (79) Britain might be said to be the exception in this alliance division. She followed generally a middle of the road policy and on many instances saved the situation by timely compromises.

The north Albanian difficulties centered around the port of Scutari. Montenegro desired the annexation of this important port while Austria-Hungary insisted on its staying in Albania. This situation became critical when the Montenegrins occupied the

port after a fierce struggle against its Turco-Albanian defenders. With Sir Edward Grey's influence the Montenegrins were finally persuaded to evacuate Scutari and the Austro-Hungarian view that Scutari should remain in Albania prevailed. The decision to establish an independent Albania automatically frustrated the Serbian hopes for a direct outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Difficulties then presented themselves on the question of the boundaries between Albania and Serbia. The result was a compromise between the Austrian and Russian views.

In the south the Greeks had occupied all of Epirus and were asking for its annexation to Greece. The Greek claims, however, met with very strong and persistent opposition from both Italy and Austria-Hungary. Italy was particularly concerned about the coastal section of Northern Epirus while together with Austria-Hungary they opposed the Greek claims to the interior of Northern Epirus centering around the important city of Koritza.

Through the southern boundary discussions, France was the consistent, indeed, one might say, the sole supporter of the Greek point of view. While a certain amount of this interest in Greece was due to its Philhellenic inclinations, France was also looking after her own interests by supporting Greek claims. (80) Since its unification, Italy was becoming more and more of an important element in the struggle for Mediterranean supremacy and was coming more and more into conflict with French interests in the Near East. The logical country to be used as a counterpoise against Italian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean from the French viewpoint was Greece. France was thus hoping to develop Greece as a Mediterranean power. (81) The larger Greece was, the stronger she would be as a Mediterranean power. French-Austrian antagonism was traditional. Albania afforded them the area of political conflict in the Balkans for the moment.

The Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, had wisely followed the suggestion of the Italians not to occupy Valona. The Greek memorandum submitted to the Ambassadorial Conference at London renounced

Greece's claims to Valona. (82) The boundary then asked was to start a bit to the south of the Bay of Valona at the town of Grammata, run in a jagged-straight line north of Tepeleni and Klissura and then northward and east to encompass Moschopolis and Koritza. (83) That the Greek claims were extravagant in the views of Austria-Hungary and Italy may be seen by the statement of the then Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister after his conversation with the Italian Ambassador in Vienna:

Neither the cabinet of Vienna nor that of Rome could give its consent to the delimitation which the Greek Government has in view, which tends to separate from Albania the territories which the two Governments consider essentially necessary for the vitality of the Albanian State. (84)

Since the Albanian memorandum to the Ambassadorial Conference did not specifically include Northern Epirus within the boundaries of the Albania it was expounding, (85) the burden of setting a limitation to Greek expansion fell upon Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian proposal for the Greek-Albanian boundary outlined the Austro-Italian views. This boundary was to "include Dibra and Lake Ochrida, also Koritza and finally follow the course of the Kalamas which flows into the sea opposite Corfu." (86)

France took up the issue and contested the Austro-Hungarian and Italian views. Cambon, the supporter of the Greek desires at the Ambassadorial Conference "declared that he was not in a position to adhere to the Italo-Austrian view." (87) On the coastal issue the argument was essentially between France and Italy. The Italians were disinclined to allow the Greeks to establish their frontier too far up along the Adriatic or beyond Corfu for that matter. (88) They were moved to a great extent by the fear that if both coasts of the Corfu Channel were under the control of one power they would be a future menace to Italian security on the Adriatic. They were afraid that some day the Corfu Channel would harbor a French fleet. (89) The French in vain tried

to get the frontier to start at Cape Cephalo on the coast. The Italian Ambassador at the London Conference, strongly supported by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, declared "that Phthia and Koritza were the Pillars of Hercules for his Government beyond which it could not go." (90)

In the discussions over the interior, Austria-Hungary took the lead while Italy played the supporting role. When the difficulty of satisfying the Greek claims as to the coast appeared, France tried to retain Koritza for Greece. However, Austria-Hungary insisted that Koritza be allotted to Albania as much as France insisted that it should go to Greece. (91) The contradictory views of France and Austria-Hungary on this point thus created a "delicate situation." (92) The French Foreign Minister, Pinchon, after being told by Sir Edward Grey of Austro-Hungarian persistence on the matter decided that getting Koritza for Greece would be quite unattainable. (93)

Closely tied up with the southern Albanian boundaries was the disposition of the islands of the Aegean Sea. The Greek navy had occupied all the islands held by Turkey during the course of the war against that country and Italy, as a result of the Italo-Turkish War, was in occupation of the so-called Dodecanese group situated off the southwest coast of Asia Minor. These islands were of tremendous strategic importance, some of them commanding the approaches to the Dardanelles. Their future was therefore of vital importance to all the Powers and especially to the contenders for Mediterranean supremacy. The solution of the southern boundary of Albania was therefore eventually linked to the islands question. Italy in particular insisted that the two questions should be linked together. That the Italians thought of using the islands as alternate bargains in return for limitations on Greek desires in the southern boundary question is evidenced by Italy's reservation in agreeing to the cession of Crete to Greece. The Italian Ambassador, Marquis Imperiali, agreed with the other Ambassadors at London on Crete going to Greece but "Italy would then expect that Greece

should moderate her claims to southern Albania." (94) On another occasion when the question came up as to what would be done in the event the Greeks refused to evacuate the disputed areas Marquis Imperiali replied that Italy would not evacuate the Dodecanese. (95) The Italian occupation was looked upon as temporary by all concerned over the Dodecanese. Britain and France especially attached great importance to the fate of the islands. Britain was particularly interested "that no one of these islands should be claimed or retained by one of the Great Powers." (96)

Another aspect of the southern boundary question was the problem of the Cutchowallachians. The Cutchowallachians are a nomadic people of Rumanian origin who are to be found in colonies in various spots in the Balkan peninsula. They were quite numerous in the area of dispute in Epirus—southern Albania and the question had come up as to whether the mountainous lands they inhabited in the center of the disputed area should go to Albania or Greece. The discussion on this question also fell in with the pattern of the other problems with France and Austria-Hungary and Italy taking their respective opposing views.

On June 18, 1913, Sir Edward Grey announced that all the Powers had come to agree that the Greek-Albanian frontier was to begin at Cape Stylos directly across from the town of Corfu. (97) The question of the interior was as yet open. Sir Edward Grey then came forth with a proposal that an international delegation be appointed to investigate the ethnology of the disputed area. Austria, however, announced that she would only accept such a proposal on the condition that Koritza as well as Stylos went to Albania. (98) At this point Sir Edward attempted to bring about an agreement by proposing the simultaneous solution of the islands question and the Albanian-Greek frontier by associating them together. He was ready to adopt the Austro-Italian desires which called for Stylos and Koritza going to Albania if all the Aegean Islands (except Imbros and Tenedos which were to be reserved for Turkey and Thasos

and Samothrace which were to have been subject to settlement by the Balkan States) were allowed to Greece. This settlement was predicated on the supposition that Italy would concurrently return the Dodecanese to Turkey. Sir Edward made it plain to the German Ambassador that France and England would accede to the Austro-Italian views only on this basis. (99)

In the ensuing discussions, Prince Lichnowsky came forward with a proposal whereby the Dodecanese would be returned to Turkey subject to a final disposition by the Powers as part of the whole Balkan settlement. Sir Edward accepted the proposal and put forth five points as a basis for the settlement of the southern boundary in connection with the islands question:

1. An International Commission will carry out the delimitation of the southern and south-eastern frontier of Albania, with instructions to give Koritza, Stylos and the island of Sasseno to Albania.
2. Neutralization of the Corfu Channel.
3. Subject to certain conditions of neutrality, Greece will retain possession of the islands inhabited by a majority of Greeks and occupied by Greek forces, with the exception of Tenedos, Imbros and Thasos.
4. Italy declares that as soon as the Ottoman troops and Ottoman artillery have evacuated, Cyrenaica, in accordance with Article 2 of the Lausanne Treaty, she will evacuate the islands occupied by her and restore them to Turkey.
5. The Powers will settle the fate of these islands in the final settlement. (100)

The five points were submitted to the Governments of the Powers for consideration. Russia, with the exception of a minor reservation regarding Sasseno, endorsed the five points. France tried hard to the last to score some advantage from her retreat. She replied that she would accept the proposed delimitation of the Albanian frontier with Stylos and Koritza going to Albania on the condition that all the Aegean Islands, except Imbros and Tenedos, but including the Italian occupied Dodecanese, should go to Greece. Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany and Italy, made the acceptance of the five

points conditional upon the following reservations: that an exact definition of the line between Stylos and Koritza be made; that Rumania be allowed to look after the interests of the Cutchowallachians in Epirus; and that the Boundary Commission should be along ethnographical and geographical lines, also that the Conference should demand immediate evacuation by the Greeks of the area allotted to Albania. (101)

Sir Edward Grey replied to these reservations that it would be different for the Conference to set down the exact frontier since it did not have the necessary information and that definition of the frontier between Stylos and Koritza belongs to the Boundary Commission. In this he was supported by the French, Russian and German Ambassadors. Concerning the Cutchowallachian reservations, Grey observed that since Greece and Rumania were allies it was for them to decide the privileges and guarantees to be given the Cutchowallachians in the territories that would be annexed to Greece. Again, the French, Russian and German Ambassadors agreed. The Conference agreed to the Austro-Hungarian proposals regarding the decision of the areas to be demarcated.

On August 8, Austria-Hungary announced the acceptance of an International Commission for the delimitation of the frontier of southern Albania if the following conditions were accepted:

1. The area for demarcation by the Commission must not remain indefinite. Its boundaries in the west are the mountains which separate the coastline allotted to Albania as far as Phtelia from the valley of Argyrocastron; in the northeast the boundary line of the former Ottoman Kasa Koritza. The intervening area for demarcation by the Commission is bounded on the north by the line given in M. Venizelos' memorandum, and on the south and south-east by the line proposed by Austria-Hungary.

2. It is settled in advance that the coastline as far as Phtelia, including the Island of Sasseon, the areas north of the Greek line and the former Ottoman Kasa Koritza together with the western and southern banks of Lake Ochrida from the village of Lin to the Svet Naum Monastery shall belong to Albania entire.

3. The Commission shall begin its work on the 1st September and conclude it on the 30th of November this year.

4. The Commission shall complete its work in sections, taking into account the natural formation of the valleys.

5. The delimitation of the frontier shall follow ethnographical and geographical principles; ethnographical affinity shall be determined by the mother tongue of the population, that is, by the language spoken in family life; the Commission shall ignore all attempts at a plebiscite or other political manifestations.

6. As regards the district inhabited by Wallachians the Commission has to establish their nationality. The question of its assignment to Albania or Greece shall be the subject of a direct understanding between Rumania and Greece.

7. The evacuation by Greek troops of the areas allotted to Albania shall take place not later than one month after the conclusion of the Commission's work. (102)

The German and Italian Ambassadors agreed to the conditions introduced by Austria-Hungary. Sir Edward Grey disagreed with the arrangement of article 6 and proposed his own draft which made the Commission responsible for the establishment of the nationality of the Wallachians but which would leave the assignment of the districts inhabited by these people to the Powers, and that the guarantees to be granted would be subject to direct agreement between the Greeks and the Rumanians. The acceptance by Austria-Hungary of this modification resulted in the general acceptance of the Austrian proposal.

On August 12, 1913, Sir Edward Grey was able to announce in the Parliament:

We have at last, after discussing many tedious details, reached an agreement which covers Albania and the Aegean Islands . . . an international commission of control is to be established with regard to Albania, with a *gendarmerie* under officers selected from one of the smaller neutral Powers, the object being to set up an autonomous State, eventually under a Prince selected by the Great Powers.

We have now come to an agreement for the delimitation under certain agreed conditions of the southern and south-eastern frontiers of Albania, which will complete the whole frontier of this State. (103)

Although the London Conference had specified the time at which the Commission of Inquiry was to begin its work, delays prevented it from assembling till over a month later. Its work has been subjected to various interpretations. (104) Once in Epirus, the Commissioners split up into the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance pattern, the French, British and Russian representatives ranged themselves in opposition to the Austro-Hungarian, Italian and German representatives. (105) It may be imagined what difficulties would be encountered in an area where the people are largely bilingual if the criterion for their nationality is language. The Triple Alliance group felt that the majority of the people in the places they visited had Albanian as their native tongue. While the Entente group recognized that the older generation in quite a few villages spoke Albanian, they pointed out that the younger generation and even some of the older generation were Greek in language as well as aspirations. (106)

The split in the ranks of the Commission was also reflected in the diplomatic relations of the Powers. The Italians and Austrians in identical notes accused the Greeks of hampering the work of the Commission by inciting the population of Southern Albania; they also informed Greece that both of their Governments had instructed their representatives to consider all the villages where any opposition was encountered as Albanian. (107) On the other hand the British member of the Commission of Inquiry thanked the Greek authorities for the facilities they accorded the Commission. (108) The Austro-Italian *démarche* caused concern and irritation in both France and England. (109) In its reply to the note, the Greek Government made it clear that it looked to the Ambassadorial Conference, rather than to Rome or Vienna for instructions. (110)

The differences in diplomatic opinion and the split in the ranks of the Commission did not allow

it to complete its original task. (111) In view of these difficulties, Britain proposed a compromise frontier in the disputed area between Koritza and Stylos to which the other Powers assented. This British proposal was a modification of the boundary suggested by the British representative of the Commission, Colonel Doughty Wylie, after the difficulties arose. The compromise boundary proposed by Britain was to start at Pogradetz in order to go towards a point north of Lake Prespa, then follow the eastern limit of the Kaza of Koritza, passing not far from Castoria; from the southern extremity of the Kaza of Koritza it was to go in an almost straight line towards Leskoviki, from Leskoviki it would go towards the Corfu Channel to end at Cape Stylos. (112) Argyrocastro with its entire valley thus fell to Albania, while Konitza (not to be confused with Koritza) and the Pindus area were left to Greece. This boundary was adopted in the Protocol of Florence (December, 1913) which defined the Greek-Albanian frontier. On February 13, the Powers addressed a note to the Greek Government stating that the formal conferring of the Aegean Islands to Greece would be conditional upon the evacuation by the Greek troops of the territories assigned to Albania by the Protocol and upon the formal pledge of the Greek Government not to resist or sustain or encourage any resistance to the state of things as established in Southern Albania by the Powers; the evacuation of the troops was to take place in a specified period, and was to start by the evacuation of the Kaza of Koritza and end by the evacuation of the Kaza of Delvino. (113) The Greek Government in its reply, after expressing its sorrow at having to separate itself from the regions of "Greek culture and national conscience," stated that it would conform to the decisions of the Powers and would order its troops to evacuate within the prescribed time the regions allocated to Albania; it then made the formal pledge not to offer or encourage resistance to the state of things in Albania. (114)

This exchange of notes was followed by a revolutionary outbreak in Southern Albania. The Greek

element and the Greek sympathizers revolted against their inclusion in the Albanian State. This was not a spontaneous movement, there were signs of it even while the Commission was at work in the disputed area. As early as November 1913 a French journalist accompanying the Commission reported the formation in Northern Epirus of militant and patriotic "sacred legions." (115) The uprising caused grave concern in Europe as well as embarrassment to the Powers. The revolted population established a provisional government at Argyrocastro and the leadership was entrusted to M. Christaki-Zographos. According to M. Zographos the Epirots aimed at one of three solutions: 1) complete autonomy under the Prince of Albania; 2) administrative or cantonal autonomy, or 3) a European occupation and administration of sufficient duration to inform Europe on the true situation in Albania. (116) The course of events in Northern Epirus following the uprising have been subjected to various interpretations. However, no one seems to doubt the unhealthy situation thus produced. The International Control Commission which had been formed to guide Albania on its first lap as a nation felt that the situation thus created could not continue. The Commissioners, with the authorization of the Governments they represented, invited MM. Zographos and Carapanos of the Epirot Government to the island of Corfu in order to come to an understanding and to end the hostilities.

Following the discussions of the International Commission of Control with the Epirot delegates, an agreement was signed May 17, 1914 whereby the autonomists were granted satisfaction on almost every point. It was signed by the representatives of the Powers, by an Albanian delegate and by the Epirots. The agreement was to apply to all the territory in Southern Albania occupied till then by the Greek troops and comprising the Provinces of Argyrocastro and Koritza. In the preamble the Commission stated the reason for the agreement:

The International Commission of Control, in order to avoid the resumption of hostilities, believes it to be

its duty to reconcile as much as possible the point of view of the Epirote populations with regard to the special dispositions which they ask for, and that of the Albanian Government. (117)

Provision was made for a special, almost autonomous, organization of the two provinces. The maintenance and execution of this special organization was to be entrusted to the International Commission of Control. The Commission was to organize the departments of administration and justice; the governors and lesser officials would have been appointed and recalled by the Albanian Government in accord with the Commission. The *gendarmerie* for the two provinces was to be made up of men recruited from the local elements and in each district only men would be employed who belonged to the faith of the locality wherein they were used; in time of peace non-native military forces were not to be transferred or employed in those provinces; the Orthodox Communities were guaranteed their privileges with no interference; the schools were to be free and in the Orthodox Communities the instruction was to be in Greek, and while Albanian was to be taught concurrently in the three elementary classes, religious education was to be exclusively in Greek; the use of Greek as well as Albanian was guaranteed before all authorities, in the Courts, and in the elective councils; the Powers were to guarantee the observance of all the stipulations. (118)

The Corfu Statute marks a departure from the Protocol of Florence. At Florence, Northern Epirus was assigned to Albania without qualifications. It was to form a part of the Albanian State and was to be placed under the central Albanian administration on the same basis as the rest of the country. The Statute recognized the special character of Southern Albania. However, it may not be looked upon as constituting a recognition of the Greek political claims on the said territory. It merely marks the recognition by the Powers that there was a substantial element, Greek in feeling, in the southern provinces

which was important enough to have cultural autonomy and an organization unlike the rest of the Albanian State.

The great European War of 1914 broke out before a true test could be made of the agreement of Corfu, before the Albanian Government could undertake to apply it. In the meantime the newly created Albanian State did not meet the expectations of its friends. The ruler picked for Albania by Europe, the Prince of Wied, could do little to reconcile the warring factions and to establish an effective central authority. The play of external and internal forces upon Albania tended to render it helpless and by the fall of 1914 the Albanian State had fallen to pieces. The northern districts fell to local administrations and chieftains, Valona was in the hands of the International Commission of Control and Durazzo and its area was ruled by Essad Pasha. The shattered State was now at the mercy of its friends and foes alike. The European War prevented joint action by the Powers to safeguard its integrity. The future of Albania indeed looked dark and its role throughout the war was to be that of a pawn.

Italy was the only Great Power not to enter the war from the very beginning. However, although she stayed on the sideline, she did not overlook her interest; and again Southern Albania, especially Valona, drew a lot of attention from Italy. Irregulars were still operating in the south and the assurances of Venizelos that no attempt would be made at Valona was of little comfort to the Italians. (119) The importance Valona held for Italy is evidenced by the fact that in her negotiations with both the Entente and with her allies of the Triple Alliance, Valona was a major factor in the discussions. Accordingly Italy felt that she must move to safeguard her interest. On October 30, 1914 Italian marines occupied the islet of Sasseno in the Bay of Valona. The Italian Prime Minister, Salandra, was able to secure the consent of the Powers without much difficulty, "though he found the Austro-Germans somewhat more amenable than the Entente." (120) The consent of Austria-

Hungary to the Italian landing at Sasseno was secured when the Italians pointed out that it would have the effect of showing to the Entente that the Triple Alliance was still in effect. (121) On the other side France was rather pleased by the move seeing in it a move aimed at her enemies. (122)

Greece also found a chance to intervene in those districts in which she was interested. The situation in Southern Albania as in the rest of the country was very unsettled. Early in October, Venizelos asked Britain to arrange negotiations between Rome and Athens with the end in view of allowing Greek troops to go in and occupy Northern Epirus in order to safeguard the districts from the unsettled conditions. (123) At the same time it was implied that Valona should be occupied by Italy. (124) The provisional nature of the intended occupation in addition to implying Italian occupation of Valona made Italian consent possible and the endorsement of the Entente was also forthcoming. On October 14, the Greek troops occupied Santi-Quaranta, Premeti and Argyrocastro. Germany and Austria-Hungary also agreed to the Greek occupation on the condition that it in no way would work against the Conference of London. (125) Late in November 1914 Italy occupied Valona. Southern Albania was thus in Greek and Italian hands.

This permission given to the Greeks to police the territory they coveted does not necessarily mean the recognition of their claims to this territory. The Greeks themselves misinterpreted the mandate. While Venizelos held from the first that the occupation was strictly a police measure, (126) the Government that followed him in 1915, took the attitude that Northern Epirus had become a part of Greece and even allowed deputies from Northern Epirus to sit in the Greek Parliament. (127) Following this presumptive attitude by Greece, the Entente Powers and Italy through their envoys in Athens asked for an explanation and reminded the Skouloudis Government that it was overstepping its bounds. (128)

It is clear that the Entente Powers did not intend the Greeks to annex the territory at the time.

However, the occupation had some hopeful implications for the Greeks. By virtue of the Greek occupation the question of Northern Epirus was reopened and in many instances occupations are a preliminary to annexations, especially where a country is allowed to occupy territory it covets. When the agreement for the occupation of Northern Epirus by the Greeks and Valona by the Italians was reached, "the duty of pronouncing definitely as to these occupations" was left for the Peace Conference. (129) The question was to be subject to settlement by that Conference.

After the occupation and during the course of the European War, Northern Epirus was used by the Powers as an attraction for the Greeks to enter the war. Greece's key position by land and sea was appreciated early in the war by both the Entente Powers and the Central Powers. However internal Greek difficulties combined with the uncertainty of the roles Turkey and Bulgaria would play, prevented the Greeks from making an early entry. The Entente Powers in particular offered irresistible inducements to the Greeks. Both sides offered Northern Epirus. In fact the first offer forthcoming was Northern Epirus from the Entente. The English, Russian and French envoys in Athens offered it to Greece November 22, 1914 with the exception of Valona, on the condition that the Greeks help Serbia which was being attacked. (130) Venizelos was willing to accept this offer if a guarantee were forthcoming from Rumania that she would aid against Bulgaria if the latter attacked Greece. When Rumania failed to offer assurances, Greece did not aid Serbia and the Entente offer did not materialize. Later Germany made a similar offer of Northern Epirus in return for Greek cooperation with Germany in the war. (131) This of course also fell through when Greece did not join Germany. Both of these offers were in the spirit of bargains conditioned on Greek entry into the war. But again the offer to the Greeks of territory coveted by them implies an element of recognition in the sense that in return for Greek cooperation the Powers in question would have taken cognizance of their claims.

A more significant recognition of the Greek claims by the Entente Powers is seen in the so-called secret treaty of London of April 1915. Before the Italians entered the war they engaged in extensive discussions with their allies as well as with the Entente as to possible compensations for Italy. When Italy's demands which included the Trentino, extensive frontier rectifications on the eastern Italian frontier at the expense of Austria, Valona and its hinterland, and the relinquishing of Austro-Hungarian interests in Albania were refused by Austria-Hungary, Italy denounced the alliance with that State early in May 1915. In the meantime Italy had been conducting negotiations with the Entente for a possible working agreement. Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador, pressed his country's claims in London. Italy wanted Entente sanction for the acquisition of the Trentino (and South Tyrol), all of Istria, Dalmatia to the Narenta River, the possession of Valona with a sufficient hinterland so that control of the Adriatic could have been assured, recognition of Italian sovereignty to the Dodecanese, and a share in Turkey and the German colonies. (132) When the Italians withdrew southern Dalmatia from the demands, Russian opposition was withdrawn and an understanding was made possible. In return Italy agreed to war on the Central Powers. France, England, Russia and Italy signed the resulting document which is known as the secret treaty of London. The Albanian section of this treaty granted Valona with a sufficient hinterland and the Island of Sasseno to Italy. Article 7 read:

Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in article 5, and the Bay of Valona (article 6), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralized State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (. . .) up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralized.

Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers.

Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida. (133)

In effect the treaty partitioned Albania between Italy, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia. It completely ignored and reversed the Florence Protocol. The Entente Powers reserved the right to assign Southern Albania to Greece and Italy agreed not to oppose this. Undoubtedly this expressed willingness to transfer sections of the Albanian State as constituted in 1913 to Greece and the other Albanian neighbors by the Entente Powers was to a great extent the result of trying to keep Italian expansion in the Balkans to a minimum. They could not have refused to meet Italian demands in Albania as elsewhere under the pressure of war, but they could attempt to circumscribe them.

With the fall of Venizelos from power, Greece, under the unquestioned lead of King Constantine pursued a neutrality which was benevolently inclined to Germany. The Allies had early in the war established a front at Thessalonike despite Greek neutrality and the Constantinist Government in Greece later obliged the Germans by allowing the Bulgarians to cross the Greek frontier to attack the allied expedition. In May 1916, the very important frontier fort of Rupel was surrendered to the Bulgarians opening Macedonia to them. When this happened the Italians began to fear that the Greeks would likewise retreat from Epirus:

The Italians are prepared to believe that we shall retreat before the Bulgarians, with or without the aid of the Austrians, in Epirus, as we have retreated in Macedonia. (134)

The surrender of Rupel thus led also to the termination of the Greek occupation of Northern Epirus. The Allies fearing for the safety of their Macedonian front demanded the demobilization of the Greek army. The Italians also asked the inclusion of Northern Epirus in the demobilization plans. (135) The Greek Prime Minister, Zaimis, replied to Italy

that the Greek army including the detachments in Northern Epirus was being placed on a peace footing. (136) The Italians then pushed from Valona and occupied Argyrocastro and Santi-Quaranta rolling the royalist Greek troops back. (137) The Greeks protested but did not resist. In the summer of 1917 the Allies took steps to secure their position in Northern Greece by taking police measures against the Constantinist Government. The Italians took advantage of this situation to occupy parts of Greece proper. They entered Southern Epirus and occupied the capital of that province, Jannina. (138) Their advance into Greece took them as far as Preveza and the Pindus Range. In the meantime on June 3, 1917 without consulting their allies the Italians proclaimed the independence of Albania under the protection of Italy. (139) Although this step was not well received in non-Italian circles, in the end it did not have any outstanding effect.

The unsettled and extremely complicated situation in Macedonia and Southern Albania also necessitated the occupation of portions of Southern Albania by French troops. Starting late in 1916 French detachments were sent to occupy the city of Koritza which was still held by royalist Greek officials. This movement was necessary to maintain tranquility in the area, prevent espionage and secure the extreme left flank of the allied armies operating in the Florina Monastir sector. (140) With the French came a Venizelist prefect to reassert Greek authority. This however gave rise to difficulties between Venizelists and Royalists and the Italians intrigued against the Greeks. (141) The Venizelist representative thus withdrew and France retained the administration. But the French were having a very difficult time with the Albanian comitadjes who were almost all around Koritza. One of the comitadjes' leaders suggested to the French that if they proclaimed Albanian independence under French military protection tranquillity would be forthcoming. (142) Thus in order to obtain the desired order General Sarraill, the Allied Commander in Macedonia, allowed the proclamation of the independence of the Kaza of Koritza under French

protection. (143) The Albanian flag was raised and the administration given over to Albanians of the Orthodox and Moslem faiths. The French undertook during their administration to encourage Albanian nationalism. The Greek schools were closed and in their place were established schools which taught Albanian and French concurrently. Whatever the merits of the policy of General Sarrail in Koritza, the Quai d'Orsay did not share his attitude, on the contrary being displeased. (144) The Italians as well as the Greeks were angered. The Italians, of course, saw in this French move a rival step to their own policy in Albania. The Greeks on the other hand considered this French step as dangerous to their own interests in Koritza. In reply to the Quai d'Orsay, which demanded an explanation under pressure from Rome, Sarrail answered that he did what was necessary for the army and that following his policy of non interference in the Balkan affairs he let the population do as it pleased. (145) The Quai d'Orsay thus acted to dampen the zeal of the French occupation in Koritza. The successor to General Sarrail, General Salles, abrogated the former's protocol establishing the Republic of Koritza. Soon the Greek schools were reopened. (146) However the occupation of Koritza remained in French hands till May 1920. In an agreement with Albanians the Greeks refrained from occupying Koritza following the French evacuation, both agreeing to leaving the final decision up to the Allies.

With the re-assumption of control in Greece by Venizelos and the expulsion of King Constantine, Greek troops recovered their own territories in Macedonia and Epirus and again got a foothold in Southern Albania. Late in June 1917 Greek troops of the Provisional Government landed in Preveza (Southern Epirus) along with French troops. (147) By mid July negotiations between the Greeks and Italians for the evacuation of Epirus by Italy were proceeding successfully. The Italians gradually withdrew to their original position in and around Valona.

The end of the World War saw Southern Albania under a threefold occupation. Italy was in control

of Valona with a substantial hinterland, the French controlled Koritza and its area and the Greeks occupied the rest of the territory. The Greek and Albanian points of view on the question of Northern Epirus were presented to the Peace Conference at Paris in the forms of memoranda. The keynote of the Albanian memorandum was the injustice done to the Albanian people by assigning to its neighbors territories inhabited by Albanians. In the south it looked to the readjustment of the 1913 frontier to include most of Southern Epirus which had been assigned to Greece. This was to be in line with Albanian desires to establish an ethnic frontier. It also asked for reparations for "villages burned down by the Greeks in the southern part of the country" (Northern Epirus). In contradicting the Greek claims to Northern Epirus it pointed to the fact that the Greeks claim all of the people in Southern Albania as Greeks who were of the Greek Orthodox faith:

It is exactly by making these Christians pass as though they are of Greek origin that the Hellenic Government manages to find a certain majority in some parts of Albania. But, according to this account, one should believe that there is not a single Orthodox Albanian in Albania. (148)

The Greek memorandum pointed out the Greek culture of Northern Epirus; it attempted to show the historical ties between Greece and Northern Epirus by the participation of the Epirots in the Greek War for Independence; it also stated that the national consciousness of the majority of the people was Greek. The memorandum tried to minimize race and language as criteria for nationality:

The democratic conceptions of the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit of any other criterion of nationality than that of national consciousness. Only the Teutonic conceptions could prefer the criterion of race or of language. (149)

The question of the Greek-Albanian frontier was turned over to the Greek Committee which was to deliberate and make a report on its findings. It was made up of representatives of France, Britain, the United States and Italy and was authorized to call in representatives of the people concerned in its

deliberations. The resultant report was a set of three recommendations for the solution of the Greek-Albanian frontier. The French and Britain report representing one extreme satisfied the Greek desires substantially; the Italian report representing the other extreme refused to take cognizance of the Greek claims; the American report while conceding some of the Greek claims refused to go as far as the French Britain report.

In respect of Southern Albania the statistics available offer little practical criterion of the wishes of the people concerned. Such statistics can be based only on the test of religion or on that of language; the former test is unfavourable to the Albanians, the latter is unfair to the Greeks. The British and French Delegations therefore feel obliged to take into prior consideration the actual reasons for which the frontier of 1913 has not met with the approbation of the peoples concerned. The course of events in Southern Albania since the delimitation of the above frontier (see historic Summary given in Annex 1) tend to show that this delimitation is unacceptable to very important elements in the regions concerned.

2. At the same time the British and French Delegations are impressed by the evidence given by MM. Vnizelos and Carapanos in regard to the Hellenophile sentiments of the greater part of the population, and the economic dependence of the Koritza region on the main road leading to Santi Quaranta.

3. The British Delegation are also influenced by the considerations that the problem is in effect whether this district shall be given to Greece or to Albania or placed under the protection of some European Power; they are of opinion that for political and strategic reasons it would be unfair to Greece and Serbia to place so vital a point as Koritza under the tutelage and control of another European Power.

American report:

The Delegation of the U. S. is unable to accept as satisfying evidence either the history of the troubled years 1913-14, in which foreign intrigue was active, or the testimony of parties to the contest on either side. They base their conclusions on reports of observers, corroborated by such statistical evidence as is available, and state them as follows:

1. The construction of the road through Premeti to Valona enables the districts of Koritza and of Argyrocastro to be separated without economic injury.

2. In the district south-west of the Voiussa River the majority of the population appears to be Greek in sentiment and political inclination; and is naturally connected with Greece by relations of transportation and trade.

3. In the district north-east of the Voiussa River the great majority of the population is Albanian not only by speech but also by national consciousness. No sufficient grounds have been adduced for severing from Albania this district, in which the consciousness of Albanian unity and the devotion to the Albanian cause are particularly strong.

The Italian Delegation are anxious that the existing frontier should be maintained for the detailed reasons given in Annex 2. (150)

The following are the main points made by the Italians in Annex 2 against the Greek claims: The district was inhabited by an Albanian majority (racial and linguistic); the Italian statistics showed the Moslems to be in the majority over the Christians; the events of 1914 could not be taken as an index of popular will in favor of the Greeks — whereas an argument may be presented against annexation because of the atrocities committed against the inhabitants, "Moslem or otherwise — who were Albanian in sentiment"; the Albanians had proven their national devotion by repeated revolts against the Turks; differences in religion do not necessarily lead to differences in national sentiment; the Albanian Moslem held the greater part of the landed property; the economic life of the country would be thrown off key by depriving it of its chief towns; the cultural arguments could not be accepted because the Albanians were not allowed by the Turks to have their own educational institutions—education having been guarded jealously by the Greek Patriarch; in 1880 the Greeks asked for a northern frontier in Epirus a line not very different from that established by the Florence Protocol; and lastly, the Italians pointed to a French military publication which included a map on Albania showing the Greeks to be in the minority in Southern Albania. (151)

Thus Great Britain, France and the United States were willing to a varying degree to satisfy the Greek claims while Italy alone favored the maintenance of

the frontier of 1913. However, we may not view the favorable reception of the Greek views by the British let us say as mere Philhellenism, nor the unfavorable reception by the Italians as the desire to help out the Albanians. As in 1913, the Albanian question in 1919 had its international attachments and complications. There were underlying causes, especially in the Franco-British and Italian reports, which touched intimately the interests of these Powers. The French and British had good reasons, given the situation in the Adriatic at the time, for backing the Greek claims. This is evident in the French-British report quoted above. The British attitude "was clouded by a doubt whether it was wise, if Italy were to obtain a foothold in Albania, to give her the strategic advantages of Koritza and the Santi Quaranta road which was in fact the only line of communication between Jannina and Salonika. (152) The French also adopted this attitude and persuaded the British to agree to give Koritza to Greece. (153) Italy on the other hand was still very interested in Albania; and while the Italians expected the British and French to follow through with their commitments to Italy in the secret Treaty of London, they began to wonder like the British and French if all its provisions were wise. They began to dislike the provisions regarding Albania in that Treaty. (154) They still wanted the protectorate over the Albanian State which the treaty gave them and they still wanted Valona as a naval base, but they did not like the idea of having to go along with the sections of the treaty which would have assigned portions in the north of Albania to Serbia and portions in the south to Greece. (155) Italian support of Albanian integrity may be attributed in part to the Italian desire to have a protectorate over a larger than a smaller Albania. Then of course Italy was opposed to Greek claims "because of her own political and commercial aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean." (156)

The London Treaty embarrassed the statesmen of France and Britain at Paris and threw obstacles in the path of American idealism. Hasty promises were made by the Allies to Italy when the war ap-

peared critical and now with the changed situation, with the elimination of Austria-Hungary and with the lofty ideals of self-determination expounded by Wilson it was difficult to fulfil the original promises to Italy. The American delegation did not feel bound to all secret agreements and the French and British were reluctant to adhere to the original stipulations. In fact Britain and France now regarded the entire Near Eastern question as open to a fresh settlement. (157) Accordingly Italy met with terrific obstacles in her Adriatic program. The new Serb-Croat-Slovene State was an additional obstacle in the way of Italian plans for the Northern Adriatic. The Italian Government which succeeded the Orlando-Sonnino Ministry therefore decided to concentrate on the Northern Adriatic. In order to do this concessions had to be made elsewhere. Tittoni, the new Italian Foreign Minister, accordingly looked up Venizelos in Paris in order to come to an agreement with him in Albania and Asia Minor — the places where Greek and Italian interests met. (158) It is unnecessary to add that Venizelos was ready to talk things over. The resulting agreement between Tittoni and Venizelos was signed July 19, 1919 in Paris. In return for Greek concessions around Scala Nova to Italy in Asia Minor and support of Italian claims for the Albanian mandate and Italian sovereignty of Valona, Italy agreed to recognize the Greeks in Smyrna, support the Greek claims to all of Thrace, give the Dodecanese to Greece and accept the assignment of Northern Epirus to Greece. The provisions relating to Albania were as follows:

2. Italy will likewise support the Greek claim to Southern Albania (Northern Epirus) within an indicated line.
3. Greece undertakes to support before the Conference the Italian claim to the Albanian mandate and to sovereignty over Valona with the necessary hinterland.

The Canal of Corfu shall be neutralized as well as the region from Cape Stylos to Aspri Ruga, including the islands and a 25 kilometer zone from the coast. (159)

This agreement marks a departure from the consistent Italian policy, followed ever since the Bal-

kan Wars, of opposing the Greek claims to Northern Epirus. With Germany and Russia eliminated from the European scene following the war, and Austro-Hungary shattered beyond hope, the Greek claims were unanimously recognized by the Powers for the moment. The main obstacle from the Greek point of view to Greek expansion in Albania was thus for the moment gone. In their further negotiations relative to the Adriatic question the Italians, following the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, accepted the satisfaction of Greek claims as part of the settlement.

The protracted negotiations over the Adriatic question also delayed the settlement of the Albanian question. The situation in Albania itself was liquid and unstable with the Italians, Greeks and Serbs adding to the complications. On the international scene the inconsistent American attitude as regards to Albania was a major factor in delaying the solution. The Supreme Council had left the problem in a state of suspended animation. The recommendations had been made but awards and settlements did not materialize. On December 9, 1919 the American, British and French representations at Paris, in a memorandum to the Italians, presented new proposals for the settlement of the Adriatic question which included provisions for Albania. The Italians were to get a protectorate over Albania with Valona and its hinterland in full sovereignty; the northern and eastern boundaries were to remain the same as in 1913; while in the south the probable frontier was to start from Mount Tumba on the northern frontier of Greece, run northwestward along the crest of the Nemercha ridge to the sea to end at Aspri Ruga. (160) This would have included Argyrocastro in Greece but not Koritza. In a subsequent Franco-British memorandum, January 14, 1920, the French and British reverted to the position of their joint report on the Greek Committee. This memorandum proposed awarding to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State certain districts in Northern Albania; (161) Italy was to get the protectorate over Central Albania; the southern boundary was to be that proposed by the Franco-British delegates in the

Greek Committee, thus giving Koritza as well as Argyrocastro to Greece. (162) From across the Atlantic, the American President lashed out at the proposed partition of Albania. While he did not seem to disagree much with the joint American-British-French memorandum, he would not countenance the proposals of January 14:

The memorandum of the 9th December maintained in large measure the unity of the Albanian State. That of the 14th January partitions the Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three different alien Powers. (163)

The proposals then, of January 14, rendered the Adriatic settlement unworkable according to President Wilson. (164) Following this, in apparent contradiction to the presidential views, the United States Foreign Relations Committee, in May 1920, voted a unanimous resolution to give Northern Epirus to Greece. (165) This meant the whole of Epirus including Koritza. The resolution actually recognized the Greek claims fully.

The fall of the Nitri-Tittoni Ministry in Italy saw the fall of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement and Italian policy reverted to its original position vis-à-vis the Greeks. Not only did Italian policy revert to its former position of the Greek-Albanian dispute, but conditions combined which caused the Italians to change their entire Albanian policy as outlined by the treaty of London in 1915.

When reports circulated in Albania of the Greek-Italian agreement to support each other's plans in Albania, the Albanians clashed with the occupying Italian troops. (167) A new National Assembly met in Albania in January 1920, which overthrew the Provisional Government established late in 1918, which had been working along with the Italians, pledged to oppose Italian interference. This new Government established itself at Tirana, in the interior of Albania, to be away from the coast where

Italian influence was strong. The Albanians then began to drive the Italian forces to the coastal towns. (168) Soon the Italians were confined only to Valona. The Italians in other words were not faring so well. At about this time Giolitti began to question the usefulness of Valona also. The new Prime Minister felt that developments in the submarine, artillery and the use of aircraft in war would necessitate a very large hinterland in order to establish effective control at that point as contemplated. If the Italians, in case of war, did not also control the sea then Valona would be a liability beyond relief. (169) Sforza, the new Foreign Minister, began to think that Albania "was to come into the sphere of Italian influence, but not as a result of a juridical situation wounding Albanian pride and working against the very force of Italian expansion in Albania." (170) He accordingly denounced the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. (17) Italian recognition of the Greek claims was thus short-lived and Italy was again working for the establishment of Albania on the 1913 basis. A few days after Sforza informed Venizelos of the termination of the Greco-Italian agreement, Count Manzoni met with success in his negotiations with the Albanians for an Albanian-Italian **rapprochement**. In the agreement reached, Italy was to recognize Albanian independence and surrender Valona to Albania; Albania in return agreed to the retention of the Islet of Sasseno in the Bay of Valona by Italy. (172)

In the meantime Albania had taken a step which was to prove all important to her future. In a communication dated October 12, 1920 she applied for admission to the League of Nations. (173) It was a wise step in view of the prevailing circumstances. The status of Albania was precarious and her boundaries unsettled. While it was known that an Albanian Government existed, it did not enjoy **de jure** or **de facto** recognition. (174) Even Italy which had come to an agreement, Albanian independence dis-

claimed any recognition. (175) Following the Italian settlement with Albania, both Greece and Serbia agreed with Albania to a **modus vivendi** on their respective holdings in Northern and Southern Albania. (176) All parties agreed to await the decision of the Peace Conference for the final disposition of the disputed areas. The Greeks and Serbs held parts of Albania as constituted in 1913. In a communication to the Secretary General of the League, the Albanian Foreign Minister stated that the:

Present Government rules over territory assigned to Albanian State by London and Florence Conference except parts of North and North-East which are now under arbitrary Yugo-Slav occupation and part of South-East in district of Koritz (Koritz), which is retained by Greece. (177)

With the concentration of Greek energies in Asia Minor the Greek occupation had dwindled in Northern Epirus to the district mentioned in the telegram.

The Albanian request for admission was handed to the Committee for Admissions. While recognizing that some sort of government existed in Albania, this Committee felt that Albanian admission "should be adjourned until the international status of Albania shall have been established." (178) However the Albanian application met with a very sympathetic response on the part of the League Assembly. Lord Robert Cecil, the South African delegate and warm champion of Albania, asked for its admission contrary to the recommendations of the Committee. He asserted that two conditions for admission — that the applicant must be a state and that it must be self governing — were satisfied. (179) The British delegate, Mr. Fisher, who had voted with the majority on the Admissions Committee against Albania, now went along with Sir Robert. He stated that although it was true that it was doubtful that Albania had a stable government or that Albania had **de jure** recognition or that it had settled frontiers, the counter considerations had to be realized: Albania was surrounded by League Members and that Albanian entrance into the League would help Balkan peace. (180) In the vote that followed all of the 35 States that

voted cast their votes for Albania's admission into the League.

The Albanians followed their successful admission into the League of Nations with an appeal to that body to take steps to settle the Albanian question. Although the Conference of Ambassadors was charged with the task of fixing the Albanian boundaries nothing had been done in 1920 or the early part of 1921. A note dated April 29, 1921 addressed to the Secretary-General of the League by Mr. Frasheri, the President of the Albanian delegation in Paris, brought to the Secretary's attention the fact that portions of Albania were occupied by Greeks and Serbs and asked that steps be taken to have the occupied areas evacuated. (181) This was followed by a telegram from the Albanian Prime Minister. June 15, 1921, appealing to the League Council under Article II of the Covenant of the League. (182) Following these appeals the Council of the League invited Greece, Albania and Serbia to send delegates to its 13th session to state their respective cases.

The Albanian delegate dwelt on the legalistic aspect of his country's recent history. He held that the 1913 settlement which had established the existence of an independent Albania and which was recognized by the Great Powers was in no way invalidated by subsequent arrangements. "More particularly, he refused to recognise the validity of the provisional Agreements of London of 1915, whereby the partition of the greater part of Albania and an Italian protectorate over the remainder was negotiated between England, France, Italy and Russia. He contended that the arrangement of 1915 had been definitely set aside by the Treaty of Rapallo and the preliminary Protocol of Tirana, under which Italy had renounced her claim to a protectorate, and recognised the sovereignty of Albania over Valona. (183) The League of Nations he held to be the successor of the "Concert of Europe" which had fixed the original boundaries of Albania, and therefore the League alone was competent to decide the Albanian issue. He refused to accept the competence of the Ambassadorial Conference to deal with the Albanian question

because the Conference was only concerned with victors and vanquished. (184) The Albanians maintained that their country had been neutral during the war. In conclusion the Albanian delegate asked the Council to dispatch a commission to Albania to make inquiries on the spot in order to ascertain the facts.

In reply the delegates of Greece read the report of the 5th Committee, which had originally handled the admission of Albania, which pointed out that the Albanian frontiers had never been entirely determined. (185) He countered the Albanian doubt as to the competency of the Conference of Ambassadors by pointing out that the Albanians themselves had appealed to the Peace Conference. (186) After holding that the Principal Powers had the right to determine the Albanian frontiers, he questioned whether it was possible "to invoke the jurisdiction of the League" since the question was already pending in the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors and without waiting for its judgment.

The Council upheld the Greek viewpoint on the competence of the Ambassadorial Conference to deal with the Albanian question. Since the Conference "was discussing it at the moment, it would be inadvisable to take it up simultaneously." (187) The three parties were advised to abstain "from any act calculated to interfere with the procedure in course"; at the same time it was stated that the Council would give its utmost attention to safeguarding the Albanian people and nation. (188) The delegate from Albania nevertheless refused to accept the competence of the Ambassadorial Conference and requested that the Albanian question be placed on the agenda of the second League Assembly.

In accordance with this request, the problem was taken up by the Assembly. Committee 6 had been entrusted with the preliminary considerations of the Albanian question. This Committee made two recommendations relative to Albania which were presented in its report to the Assembly: 1) a resolution recommending to Albania to accept the decision of

the Allied and associated Powers; and 2) a resolution calling for a Commission of three impartial persons to be dispatched immediately by the League Council to Albania to report on the execution of the decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers and on the difficulties which had arisen on the boundaries of Albania. (189) These recommendations formed the basis of the discussion that Albania would accept the decision of the Ambassadors as called for in the first recommendation. (190) This being settled, the discussion turned to the second proposal. Lord Cecil who grew weary of the Ambassadorial procrastinations felt that an immediate solution was necessary and that the recommended Commission should be dispatched immediately to determine the situation. (191) The Albanian representative expressed the same attitude. After pointing to the desirability of an independent Albania according to the highest principles of the League of Nations, the Italian representative questioned the wisdom of sending a Commission before the boundaries were fixed by the Conference. (192) In this he was supported by the French representative. M. Frangulis, one of the Greek representatives, believed that the Commission should be sent out by the Conference of Ambassadors which was handling the question. The Assembly finally came to the viewpoint of the British representative, Mr. Balfour, who pointed out the necessity of waiting for the final judgment of the Conference; that a Commission should be sent to Albania, but that the work of the "Commission must fundamentally depend on the frontiers being settled" and "that its real work will be carried on when the frontiers are determined." (193) The resolutions were thus carried pending the decision of the Ambassadors.

Finally on November 9, 1921 the long awaited pronouncement of the Ambassadors of France, Britain, Italy and Japan was forthcoming: "the tracing of the frontier of Albania, as it was established in 1913 by the Conference of Ambassadors in London is to be confirmed." (194) The Ambassadors accepted the delimitation of the southern Albanian frontier as drawn up by the Florence Protocol. A Commission

was to be appointed to trace on the spot the northern and eastern frontier along Montenegro and Serbia since the Commission entrusted with that work in 1914 had to interrupt its work because of the outbreak of hostilities in that year.

In effect this decision of the Ambassadors brushed aside the events following 1913. The decision ended the involved see-saw political-diplomatic struggle which started with the occupation of the whole of Epirus by Greek troops during the war against the Turks.

In a further declaration the same day the representatives of France, Britain, Italy and Japan set down the procedure to be followed for the preservation of Albania in the event of a threat to its integrity. It was provided that Albania should address itself to the Council of the League for foreign assistance if she had found it impossible to maintain her territorial integrity; if she did not avail herself of her right of request in time, any one of the signatories to the agreement could have brought the situation to the attention of the Council; the restoration of the territorial frontiers of Albania was to have been entrusted to Italy; it was also stated that any modification of Albanian frontiers constituted a danger to the safety of Italy. (195) This declaration in reality established Italy as the guardian of Albania with the League Council deciding when Italy was to assume the role of guardian.

The next step was to dispatch the Commission of Enquiry to Albania. As called for in the second recommendation of Committee 6 of the League Assembly, the Council appointed three men, one from each of three small neutral countries. The Commission examined the situation on the Albanian-Greek frontier and reported to the League in a series of dispatches. The final report came from M. Sederholm of Finland and covered the various aspects of the problem. In this final report M. Sederholm reaffirmed some of the observations made in the earlier dispatches and also summed up the situation. M. Sederholm as head of the Commission visited the area alone subsequent to the visit by the Com-

mission. His journey took him to the towns of Santi Quaranta, Delvino, Argyrocastro, Leskoviki and Koritza. Although, as he reports, his visit was short, he felt that he was able to get "a fairly good insight" of the situation in Southern Albania at the time. (196)

He found that relations between Albania and Greece were very strained; however he saw hope in the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two countries. Relations seemed to be strained mainly because as information seemed to show, the Greek Government persisted in not regarding the provinces of Argyrocastro and Koritza as Albanian; the Greek army also recruited residents in Greece who were from Southern Albania, however only those were retained who could not prove their Albanian nationality; the continued occupation, "to some extent in disregard of the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors," by the Greek army of that portion of the Kaza of Koritza touching Macedonia, seemed to be especially disquieting because of the economic dislocation resulting from the separation of the outskirts from the city of Koritza. (197)

The status of the Orthodox Church in Southern Albania was in the process of undergoing a change at the time of M. Sederholm's visit. A movement had been put under way by Albanian emigrants from America which looked to the establishment of a national Albanian Orthodox Church. This movement found favor from the Albanian authorities and from the nationalists, most of whom were also returned American emigrants. The nationalists seized some of the Churches of Koritza and began to celebrate mass in the Albanian language. However, when this happened the majority of the Orthodox refused to attend Church. (198) A solution of the Church problem seemed to be forthcoming when an Orthodox Congress consisting of representatives of the Orthodox Albanian communities (except from the province of Argyrocastro) decided to establish an autocephalous Church in Albania and to apply for approval to the Patriarchate. The Patriarch received the Congress's desires favorably and sent an Exarch to start the Albanian Church on its road to independence. (199)

M. Sederholm found the Grecophone element to be about 17% of the whole population of Southern Albania. This he found to be concentrated particularly in the Argyrocastro region. (200) The remainder then, all spoke Albanian in their homes. According to the minority declaration to which Albania adhered, instruction in the schools was to be in the language preferred by the individual communities. The Albanian Government maintained primary schools in the Greek speaking areas with Greek the language of instruction. Secondary schools which had been closed under the Italian occupation were not reopened. The chief complaint of the Greek population seemed to be the lack of sufficient teachers in the crowded schools. (201) When these communities offered to pay for additional teachers themselves, the Albanian Government refused. M. Sederholm lodged a protest on this score to the Government in Tirana. In Koritza where the population was found to be Albanophone, Greek schools had been closed and instruction in the primary schools, a number of kindergartens and the girls' schools was in Albanian. (202) French replaced Greek for purposes of higher endeavor since the Albanian language was not yet sufficiently developed and books in Albanian were lacking. M. Sederholm seems to have felt in his report that it would have been better to have continued the use of Greek until that time when Albanian could have been introduced. "On the other hand, however, it is easy to understand that the Albanian Government did not wish to maintain Greek schools at a time when Greece was claiming the region in question, asserting that it was a Greek country." (203)

M. Sederholm found some discontent amongst the Christian element of the south. The economic dislocation of the moment offered one source of dissatisfaction. The Christians complained that the taxes fell more heavily upon them than upon the Mohammedans. It was found that the southern provinces of Koritza and Argyrocastro supplied the greater part of the Albanian budget but only a small fraction of the total budget was used upon these provinces. It was also found that the southern Christians had pro-

portionately less influence in the Government than the Mohammedans and Catholics. By gerrymandering and lack of proportional representation the Mohammedans were put in indisputable control of whole regions. (204) By the retention of former Turkish officials in administration, the Christians began to feel that Albania was a continuation of the old order. However, despite much to be desired, M. Sederholm expressed the belief that in comparison to what he had learned about conditions under the Turks, immense strides had been made forward. M. Sederholm recommended that steps be taken to smooth the friction that existed. He stressed the importance of administrative reforms. After examining the available statistics on the population, he came to the conclusion that the Christian and Mohammedan populations were about evenly matched in Southern Albania. He cautioned that the Hellenophile sentiments of the greater part of the Orthodox population should not be viewed as Greek nationalism. Instead the feelings of these people for Greece should be viewed as "those for a country which has been the source of their culture and the enemy of the hated Turkish regime." (205) He concluded with the belief that the decision of the Powers in allowing "Northern Epirus" to remain in Albania as being "a just and wise one."

The report of the Commission of Enquiry was meant to give a picture of the conditions prevailing in the area confirmed to Albania. As the report points out, the enquiry had no connection with the boundary question. The decision of the Ambassadors terminated, the issue till it was reopened recently. To be sure, a Boundary Commission was sent out following the decision of the Ambassadors, consisting of Italian, French and British delegates to redefine the boundary retained by the Ambassadors and to clear up certain difficulties resulting from the Greek occupation. The importance of this Commission, however, is to be found in the incident that was created by the murder of the Italian commissioner rather than its work on the boundary. As in 1913, this Commission went to Florence and in January 1925 drew up the redefinition of the Greek-Albanian boundary. The differences

between the 1913 boundary and the new one are so slight as to be hardly perceptible. In fact on a map one can hardly tell the difference.

IV. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

The history of the problem indicates that the Greek claims to Northern Epirus or Southern Albania have been recognized in a variety of forms. However the two vital decisions, the decision of the Ambassadors at London (and the Florence Protocol) of 1913 and the decisions of the Ambassadors in Paris in 1921, what one might call the "clinching" decisions, threw Northern Epirus to Albania.

Greek hopes were high in 1913 because they had conquered Northern as well as the rest of Epirus from the Turks and could therefore claim it as a prize of war from Turkey and with claims to the culture and national consciousness of the people of Epirus they felt that their case was uncontested. However, the London Conference, due to a great extent to terrific pressure from Austria and Italy, granted the territory to the newly created State of Albania. Immediately following this award, the Greeks and Greek sympathizers in the area revolted against their inclusion in the Albanian State. In order to end the bloodshed and serious complications which the revolt presented, the Powers decided to grant to Northern Epirus a special status unlike the rest of Albania. The Great War prevented this special status from being tried. The deterioration of the newly created Albanian State and the start of the war raised Greek hopes anew by reopening the question. Greek troops were allowed to occupy the district pending a final decision by the Peace Conference that was to follow. During the war the Entente offered Northern Epirus to Greece in return for Greek entry into the war on the side of the allies. Internal dissension and international complications prevented the Greeks from profiting from this offer. A similar German offer also did not materialize. In 1915 recognition was given the Greek claims to Northern Epirus in a rather unexpected fashion when the Entente Powers reserved the

right to assign the district to Greece in their secret treaty with Italy. Thus in return for tempting concessions in the London Treaty, Italy agreed to the partition of the Albania which she had insisted upon making as large as possible. The Greek hold on Northern as well as the whole of Epirus was jeopardized by the short Italian occupation of the whole province during the Greek internal difficulties. The French encouragement of Albanian nationalism in Koritza for a brief period also helped to counteract Greek claims and interests in Northern Epirus. However, with the end of the war these difficulties were cleared away and Greek claims fell on benevolent ears at Paris in 1919. The French and British statesmen were willing to recognize most of Northern Epirus as Greek and the Americans were willing to give Greece the district of Argyrocastro. Later the American Senate was even willing to assign all of Northern Epirus to Greece. Difficulty was encountered from the direction of Italy but this too was overcome when the Italians and Greeks decided for mutual advantage to support each other's interests. Through the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement Italy recognized the Greek claims to Northern Epirus.

These recognitions were made in principle in the form of documents, memoranda and resolutions. No awards were made with the consequence that the question was left in the air for some time after the general Peace Conference in 1919. But as in 1913 Albania was destined to get the concluding decision. At the termination of the Paris Conference the suspended question was turned over to the inheritors of the Conference, the Ambassadors of France, Italy, Britain and Japan. At the end of 1921 they reaffirmed the Albanian title to the territory by recognizing the decision of 1913 which gave the area to Albania.

Whatever the settlement in the currently reopened question, it appears that like the decisions of the past it will have its international attachments. The brief diplomatic skirmish over the Greek-Albanian dispute which took place in the recent open Peace Conference in Paris has made it abundantly clear

that the issue, aside from its own merits, is bound up, and if other current issues such as the Greek-Bulgarian issue and that of Trieste may be taken as examples, will be interwoven with the diplomatic maneuvering in the Balkans between the policy of the Soviet Union on the one hand and Anglo-American policy on the other.

It is to be hoped that the issue is completely divorced from its big Power frame of reference, that it be decided on its merits and that the interests of the people of Northern Epirus or Southern Albania are the guiding principle. In the short but turbulent history of the problem about the only thing that has not been tried is a plebiscite. A plebiscite appears to be the only approach to the problem which would minimize (or even eliminate) a Great Power solution. In the past the people of the area have not been consulted in any decision regarding them whether this decision has been in favor of the Greeks or in favor of Albania. The work of the International Commission that was dispatched to Albania by the London Conference in 1913 may hardly be considered as an attempt to determine the desires of the people of the region since its area of operation was limited to a strip between Koritza and Cape Stylos and since the Commissioners disagreed with each other. The Commission of Enquiry sent out by the League of Nations seems to be a little bit more to the point having given us some excellent observations on the area. But here again a vote by the people would be much more convincing than the observations of three or four men, no matter how capable. It would not be hard to convince both the Albanians and the Greeks to agree to a plebiscite in which the people would vote either for Albania or Greece. Both claim the national consciousness or national feelings of Southern Albania or Northern Epirus and therefore neither should object to a plebiscite under strict international auspices. This way both will have a chance to prove their point—that the area is a part of Albania or that is a part of Epirus. Once the feelings of the people are determined, then it would not be too difficult to work out the economic and geographic factors.

In the last analysis it is a shame that the two oldest people in the Balkans should be at odds with each other. Although the ill feeling has been evolved to a great extent around the disposition of Northern Epirus, other elements enter. In the past this ill feeling has been accentuated by Italian interference in Albania and presently their differences are aggravated by the inclusion of Albania and Greece respectively within the opposed Soviet and Anglo-American spheres of influence. It is desirable that with the coming of peace the spheres of influence should evaporate and that the countries in these spheres will be allowed to conduct truly independent policies. It is also to be hoped that Greece and Albania will develop such policies towards each other which will look to **rapprochement** and close cooperation for their mutual interest. Greece and Albania have more in common than any other two countries in the Balkans. Besides being the only two people that can trace their past to the classical period of Balkan history, they are the only two non-Slavic people. The Greeks have an abundance of Albanian blood, while Greek culture is evident in the whole of Southern Albania. With the modern tendency toward larger political units and federation of nations, it would be very logical for the Greeks and Albanians once they have started on the road to cooperation to work for federation. Such a federation would certainly be more logical than the present inclusion of Albania in the Soviet sponsored Balkan Slavic bloc. A Greek-Albanian federation would be advantageous to both. The Greeks would no longer face the dangers of having Albania used as a base for attack upon Greece by any foreign power and the Albanians would have a greater political area in which to use their administrative talents and other abilities.

If such a federation could be forthcoming then the problem of Northern Epirus would be automatically eliminated because then it would not make much difference whether Northern Epirus remained in Albania or whether it formed a part of Greece. Both Albanians and Greeks would have access to it under the freedom of mobility to and from the area which would result from such a federation.

NOTES

1. *Chicago Tribune*, November 23, 1940, p. 1.
2. *Chicago Tribune*, September 27, 1946, p. 7.
3. *Chicago Sun Times*, August 31, 1946, p. 7.
4. *Ibid.* - 5. *Ibid.* - 6. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1946, p. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, August 31, 1946, p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*, August 10, 1946, p. 1.
9. *Chicago Tribune*, August 17, 1946, p. 3.
10. *Chicago Sun Times*, August 30, 1946, p. 1, also August 29, 1946, p. 1.
11. *Chicago Tribune*, August 6, 1946, p. 5.
12. Mehmed Bey Konitz, "The Albanian Question", *International Conciliation*, May, 1919, No. 138, New York City, p. 774. Also: *International Conciliation*, "Memorandum Submitted by the Albanian Delegation to the Peace Conference," May, 1919, No. 138, New York City, pp. 69-71.
13. Mr. Chekrezi, one of the best known Albanian writers, constantly uses the term "Southern Albania" even where the meaning would have been clearer if he had used "Northern Epirus". Constantin A. Chekrezi, *Albania Past and Present* (New York, 1919).
14. Ph. A. Philon, *The Question of Northern Epirus; Its Historical and Diplomatic Background* (Greek Government Office of Information, Washington, D. C., 1945), p. 5.
15. Herbert Wing, *The Epeiros-Albania Boundary Dispute in Ancient Times* (Washington, 1923), p. 307.
16. *Ibid.*, also: "Epirus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. VIII, 1945 ed.
17. Wing, *op. cit.*, p. 307. - 18. *Ibid.*, 313.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-313.
20. Isalah Bowman, *The New World* (New York and Chicago, 1928) p. 389.
21. Joseph Swire, *Albania; the Rise of a Kingdom* (London, 1929), p. 5.
22. Bowman, *op. cit.*, p. 390.
23. Foreign Policy Association, New York, *Albania: the Problem of the Adriatic* (New York, 1927), p. 112.
24. Bowman, *op. cit.*, p. 389.
25. Foreign Policy Association, New York, *Albania: the Problem of the Adriatic* (New York, 1927), p. 112.
26. Eleutherios Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919* (New York, 1919), pp. 2-3.
27. Christo A. Dako, *Albania, the Master Key to the Near East* (Boston, 1919), p. 177. Also see Chekrezi, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.
28. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Greek Policy Since 1882* (London, 1914), p. 26.
29. Venizelos, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
30. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
31. League of Nations, "The Enquiry in Southern Albania," Extract No. 13 of the *Official Journal*, April 6, 1923, p. 6.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

33. Nicholas J. Cassavetes, *The Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference* (Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1919), p. 73.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 77. I took the liberty of correcting some of the totals which did not tally with the figures.
35. J. A. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford, 1940), p. 223.
36. G. F. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers* (New York, 1917), p. 272.
37. *Ibid.* - 38. Marriot, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
38. Marriot, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
39. William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors* (Cambridge, 1936), p. 84.
40. Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 273.
41. *Ibid.* - 42. *Ibid.* - 43. Marriot, *op. cit.*, p. 363.
44. George Finlay, *History of Greece* (Oxford, 1877), VII, 223.
45. Marriot, *op. cit.*, p. 364.
46. Edouard Driault, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (Paris, 1925), II, 462-466.
47. W. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 380. - 48. *Ibid.*
49. Text in *Documents diplomatiques, "Congrès de Berlin, 1878"* (Paris, MDCCCLXXXVIII), p. 27.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
51. Driault, *op. cit.*, III, 492. - 52. *Ibid.*
53. W. N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After* (London, 1938), p. 88.
54. 13th Protocole of the Congress in *Documents diplomatiques, "Congrès de Berlin, 1878"*, p. 201.
55. *Ibid.* - 56. Medlicott, *op. cit.*, p. 3545.
57. Lord Courtney of Penwith, *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (Oxford, 1915), p. 342.
58. *Ibid.*, see note on page 342.
59. Dako, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-57.
60. See text of the aims of the League in Swire, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
61. Chekrezi, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
62. Quoted in Medlicott, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Documents diplomatiques, "Affaires de Grèce en 1880"* (Paris, MDCCCLXXXI), p. lxiv.
65. *Ibid.*, text of Turkish note on pp. 95-98.
66. *Ibid.*, see Saint-Hilaire's summary of the Greek situation, pp. xvii-xix.
67. *Ibid.*, Grenville to the British Ambassador in Vienna, March 21, 1881 - pp. 46-47.
68. *Ibid.*, text of the Constantinople Convention in p. 132.
69. Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916* (New York, 1925), I, 255.

70. Prince Lichnowsky, "My London Mission (1912-1914)," *International Conciliation*, June, 1918, No. 127, p. 37.
71. *Ibid.*, also: Lord Courtney, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
72. Grey, *op. cit.*, I, 255.
73. Prince Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss* (New York, 1928), p. 174.
74. Sir Edward Grey, *Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914* (London, 1931), p. 211.
75. "Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans at leurs Majestés les souverains alliés déclarent remettre à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, etc., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le Président de la République française, à Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le soin de régler la délimitation des frontières des l'Albanie et toutes autres questions concernant l'Albanie." (Section 2 of Article 2 of the Treaty of London of 1913).
76. Lord Courtney, *op. cit.*, p. 341. - 77. *Ibid.*
78. Prince Lichnowsky, "My London Mission (1912-1914)," *International Conciliation*, June, 1918, No. 127, p. 47.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
80. W. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 509.
81. Prince Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss* (New York, 1928), p. 257.
82. Edith P. Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1912-1923* (Stanford University, California, 1926), p. 26.
83. For an excellent map on the line asked by Greece at the time see: Driault, *op. cit.*, V, 150.
84. Translated and quoted in Stickney, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
86. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Jan. 15, 1913 (Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss*, (New York, 1928), p. 210).
87. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, June 11, 1913 (*Ibid.*, p. 222).
88. Prince Lichnowsky, "My London Mission (1912-1914)," *International Conciliation*, June, 1918, No. 127, p. 37.
89. Léon Maccas, *La question gréco-albanaise* (Nancy, etc., 1921), p. 121.
90. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, June 11, 1913 (Prince Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss* (New York, 1928), p. 122).
91. Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, June 15, 1913 (*Ibid.*, p. 225).
92. Stickney, *op. cit.*, p. 32. - 93. *Ibid.*
94. Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, January 2, 1913 Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss* (New York, 1928), p. 194.
95. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, June 11, 1913 (*Ibid.*, p. 222).
96. Sir Edward Grey, *Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914* (London, 1931), p. 213.

97. Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, June 18, 1913 (Lichnowsky, *Heading for the Abyss* (New York, 1928), p. 227.
98. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, July 29, 1913 (*ibid.*, p. 248).
99. Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, July 31, 1913 (*ibid.*, p. 248).
100. Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office, August 1, 1913 (*ibid.*, p. 253).
101. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor, August 5, 1913 (*ibid.*, p. 255).
102. Lichnowsky to the Imperial Chancellor, August 8, 1913 (*ibid.*, pp. 258-259).
103. Sir Edward Grey, *Speeches 1904-1914* (London, 1931), pp. 211-212.
104. Swire, *op. cit.*, p. 172: "Although the Commission had established the indisputable Albanian character of the territory thus allotted to Albania, Greece refused to abandon her claims to Korcha, Premeti and Argyrocastro, and prepared to obtain them by conspiracy." Maccas, *op. cit.*, p. 133: "Et à Florence où la Commission s'est réunie en décembre 1913, on n'a fait qu'habiller d'un habit juridique et soi-disant taillé dans l'étoffe de la vérité ethnographique, — d'une vérité ethnographique jamais recherchée et sciemment méconnue, — l'acte d'abdication le plus inique que le chantage de l'impérialisme ait jamais soutiré à la faiblesse de diplomates plus pacifistes que justes!"
105. *Le Temps*, November 13, 1913, p. 2.
106. *Ibid.*
107. *New York Times*, November 2, 1913, part 3, p. 3.
108. *London Times*, November 3, 1913 p. 8.
109. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1913, p. 8 and November 4, 1913, p. 7.
110. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1913, p. 7.
111. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1913, p. 7.
112. *Le Temps*, November 24, 1913, p. 2.
113. Part of text in Maccas, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
114. *Ibid.*, part of note quoted on pp. 136-137.
115. *Le Temps*, November 13, 1913, p. 2.
116. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1914, p. 2.
117. For text of the agreement see Venizelos, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-32.
118. *Ibid.*
119. René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1938), p. 18.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 19. - 121. Stickney, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
123. Emile Leloy, *Les Documents Secrets* (Paris, 1920), pp. 139-140.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 140; also: S. B. Chester, *Life of Venizelos* (New York, 1922), p. 219.
125. *Le Temps*, October 31, 1914, p. 2.
126. Chester, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
127. Venizelos, *cinq ans d'histoire grecque* (Paris 1917), p. 17.

128. Laloy, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
129. Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress* (New York, 1919), p. 4.
130. Laloy, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.
131. Venizelos, *Greece in Her True Light* (New York, 1916), p. 116.
132. Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
133. Great Britain, *State Papers*, "Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy, signed at London, April 16, 1915" (London 1920), Vol. LI, Miscellaneous No. 7 (1920).
134. Greek Minister in Rome to Greek Government (Chester, *op. cit.*, p. 279).
135. *Le Temps*, March 22, 1916, p. 2.
136. *Ibid.*, June 26 1916, p. 2.
137. Jacques Bourcart, *L'Albanie et les Albanais* (Paris, 1921), p. 143.
138. *London Times*, June 11, 1917, p. 8.
139. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1917, text of declaration on p. 5. Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London, 1933) p. 173.
140. Robert Vaucher, "La République Albanaise," *L'Illustration* April 7, 1917, p. 326.
141. Bourcart, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
141. Vaucher *op. cit.*, p. 326. - 143. *Ibid.*
144. Bourcart, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
145. As reported in Stickney, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
146. Bourcart, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
147. *London Times*, June 25, 1917, p. 6.
148. "Memorandum submitted by the Albanian Delegation to the Peace Conference," *International Conciliation*, May, 1919, No. 138, p. 69.
149. Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress* (New York, 1919), pp. 2-3.
150. David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924-26), X, 286-287.
151. *Ibid.*, Annex 2, pp. 295-297.
152. Nicolson *op. cit.*, p. 174. - 153. *Ibid.*
154. *Ibid.* - 155. *Ibid.*
156. Edward M. House, *What Really Happened at Paris* (New York, 1921), p. 192.
157. Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p. 216.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
159. *Ibid.*, includes an outline summary of the text on pp. 242-243.
160. Great Britain, *State Papers*, Vol. LI, "Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question", (London, 1920) pp. 4-5.
161. This was to serve as compensation for Yugoslav concessions to Italy in the Northern Adriatic and as a means of affording the new state an outlet along that part of the Adriatic.

162. Memorandum of January 14, 1920 in *British State Papers*, Vol. LI, "Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question," p. 18.
163. Wilson memorandum of February 10, 1920 (*Ibid.*, pp. 23-24). - 164. *Ibid.*
165. *Current History*, June 1920, pp. 441-442.
166. Note of February 25, 1920 in *British State Papers*, Vol. LI, "Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question," p. 30.
167. *Current History*, July 1920, pp. 583-584.
168. *Ibid.* - 169. Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
170. Carlo Sforza, *The Makers of Modern Europe* (Indianapolis, 1930) pp. 171-172.
171. *Ibid.*
172. *Current History*, September 1920, p. 1061.
173. League of Nations, "Application by Albania for Admission to the League of Nations," *League of Nations Assembly Document No. 1-100*, 1920, p. 4.
174. League of Nations, *Admission of New Members to the League of Nations (Albania)*, "Report presented by Committee V to the Assembly," December 6, 1920.
175. *Ibid.*
176. *Ibid.*, also: *Current History*, October-March, 1921, p. 535.
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179. League of Nations, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, 28th plenary meeting, December 17, 1920, p. 4.
180. *Ibid.*
181. League of Nations, *Report to the Second Assembly of the League on the Work of the Council*, August 18, 1921, Chap. I, p. 29.
182. *Ibid.*
183. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
184. *Ibid.* - 185. *Ibid.*
186. *Ibid.* - 187. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31 - 188. *Ibid.*
189. League of Nations, *Official Journal* (Special Supplement No. 6), October, 1921, pp. 35-36.
190. League of Nations, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, 28th plenary session, October 2, 1921, p. 5.
191. *Ibid.* - 192. *Ibid.*
193. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
194. Text in Swire, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-367, 195. *Ibid.*, text on p. 369.
196. League of Nations, "The Enquiry in Southern Albania," Extract No. 13 of the *Official Journal*, April 6, 1923, p. 3.
197. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. - 198. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
199. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. - 200. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
201. *Ibid.*, p. 6. - 202. *Ibid.* - 203. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
204. *Ibid.*, p. 12. - 205. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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